3.16.48-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <ja...@zx2c4.com>
commit 98c67d187db7808b1f3c95f2110dd4392d034182 upstream.
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <ja...@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johan...@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-wirel...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.b...@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop changes in
ieee80211_crypto_aes_{cmac_256,mac}_decrypt()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
goto mic_fail;
/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
