On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stu...@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>>
>>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>>
>>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>>
>>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>>
>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
>>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <se...@hallyn.com>
>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <a...@linux-foundation.org>
>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
>>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com>
>>> Cc: Oren Laadan <or...@cellrox.com>
>>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiru...@google.com>
>>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <rom...@android.com>
>>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tk...@google.com>
>>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccr...@android.com>
>>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <n...@google.com>
>>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitr...@google.com>
>>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <e...@google.com>
>>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-t...@android.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stu...@linaro.org>
>>> ---
>>> fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file
>>> *file, const char __user *buf,
>>> if (!p)
>>> return -ESRCH;
>>>
>>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> - count = -EPERM;
>>> - goto out;
>>> - }
>>> + if (p != current) {
>>> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> + count = -EPERM;
>>> + goto out;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> - err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> - if (err) {
>>> - count = err;
>>> - goto out;
>>> + err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> + if (err) {
>>> + count = err;
>>> + goto out;
>>> + }
>>> }
>>
>> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?
>
> I take back my concern. :) I think this is correct (as you mention in
> the thread: the prctl LSM hook already fired), so until there is a
But did it? The prctrl hook is just for the prctrl interface. The
proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns is separate.
This is part of my confusion here, mostly in that I'm not really sure
I have a good sense of philosophy for LSM hooks.
Are these just interface guards/hooks, or are we trying to map the
hook to the underlying action being taken?
As with the prctrl interface, it seems like its just an interface
guard, but the /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns interface checking
security_task_setscheduler() seems to be more connected to the
underlying action being done by changing the timerslack value.
thanks
-john
