Please disregard.
Stanislav
On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 06:16:26PM +0000, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
> x86/hyperv: Set X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE unconditionally
>
> Enable X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE by default as X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE is
> independent from invariant TSC and should have never been gated by the
> HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege.
>
> To elaborate, the HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege allows certain types of
> guests to opt-in to invariant TSC by writing the
> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL register. Not all guests will have this
> privilege and the hypervisor will automatically opt-in certain types of
> guests (e.g. EXO partitions) to invariant TSC, but this functionality is
> unrelated to the TSC reliability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburs...@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> index d18078834ded..14412afcc398 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
> @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
> machine_ops.crash_shutdown = hv_machine_crash_shutdown;
> #endif
> #endif
> - if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT) {
> + if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT)
> /*
> * Writing to synthetic MSR 0x40000118 updates/changes the
> * guest visible CPUIDs. Setting bit 0 of this MSR enables
> @@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
> * is called.
> */
> wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL,
> HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC);
> - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
> - }
> +
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
>
> /*
> * Generation 2 instances don't support reading the NMI status from
>
