x86/hyperv: Set X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE unconditionally

Enable X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE by default as X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE is
independent from invariant TSC and should have never been gated by the
HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege.

To elaborate, the HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT privilege allows certain types of
guests to opt-in to invariant TSC by writing the
HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL register. Not all guests will have this
privilege and the hypervisor will automatically opt-in certain types of
guests (e.g. EXO partitions) to invariant TSC, but this functionality is
unrelated to the TSC reliability.

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburs...@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
index d18078834ded..14412afcc398 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
        machine_ops.crash_shutdown = hv_machine_crash_shutdown;
 #endif
 #endif
-       if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT) {
+       if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT)
                /*
                 * Writing to synthetic MSR 0x40000118 updates/changes the
                 * guest visible CPUIDs. Setting bit 0 of this MSR  enables
@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
                 * is called.
                 */
                wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL, 
HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC);
-               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
-       }
+
+       setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
 
        /*
         * Generation 2 instances don't support reading the NMI status from



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