In an effort to separate intentional arithmetic wrap-around from
unexpected wrap-around, we need to refactor places that depend on this
kind of math. One of the most common code patterns of this is:
VAR + value < VAR
Notably, this is considered "undefined behavior" for signed and pointer
types, which the kernel works around by using the -fno-strict-overflow
option in the build[1] (which used to just be -fwrapv). Regardless, we
want to get the kernel source to the position where we can meaningfully
instrument arithmetic wrap-around conditions and catch them when they
are unexpected, regardless of whether they are signed[2], unsigned[3],
or pointer[4] types.
Refactor open-coded wrap-around addition test to use add_would_overflow().
This paves the way to enabling the wrap-around sanitizers in the future.
Link: https://git.kernel.org/linus/68df3755e383e6fecf2354a67b08f92f18536594 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [3]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [4]
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <a...@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastab...@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <and...@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin....@linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <s...@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.s...@linux.dev>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsi...@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <s...@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <hao...@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jo...@kernel.org>
Cc: b...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 65f598694d55..21e3f30c8757 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -12901,8 +12901,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
}
- if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
- umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
+ if (add_would_overflow(umin_ptr, umin_val) ||
+ add_would_overflow(umax_ptr, umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
@@ -13023,8 +13023,8 @@ static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state
*dst_reg,
dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val;
}
- if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
- dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
+ if (add_would_overflow(umin_val, dst_reg->u32_min_value) ||
+ add_would_overflow(umax_val, dst_reg->u32_max_value)) {
dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
} else {
@@ -13049,8 +13049,8 @@ static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state
*dst_reg,
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
- if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
- dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
+ if (add_would_overflow(umin_val, dst_reg->umin_value) ||
+ add_would_overflow(umax_val, dst_reg->umax_value)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
--
2.34.1
