On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:00 -0600 Jeremy Linton <jeremy.lin...@arm.com> wrote:
Hi, > For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling > or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the > documentation reflects that. > > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.lin...@arm.com> > Cc: Jonathan Corbet <cor...@lwn.net> > Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index > b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644 --- > a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1982,6 +1982,12 > @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y, > the default is off. > > + kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of > user > + and kernel address spaces. > + Default: enabled on cores which need > mitigation. Would this be a good place to mention that we enable it when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled and we have a valid kaslr_offset? I found this somewhat surprising, also it's unrelated to the vulnerability. Cheers, Andre > + 0: force disabled > + 1: force enabled > + > kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled > MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP) >
