For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.lin...@arm.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <cor...@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt 
b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1982,6 +1982,12 @@
                        Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
                        the default is off.
 
+       kpti=           [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+                       and kernel address spaces.
+                       Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+                       0: force disabled
+                       1: force enabled
+
        kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
                        Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
 
-- 
2.17.2

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