update/obsolete RFC 8247

From: John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>
Date: Saturday, 7 December 2024 at 09:55
To: Rebecca Guthrie <rmgu...@uwe.nsa.gov>, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) 
<sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>, ipsec@ietf.org <ipsec@ietf.org>
Cc: Kampanakis, Panos <kpa...@amazon.com>, Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi>
Subject: Re: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt
Rebecca Guthrie wrote:
>I expected to see an adoption call issued before Dublin

+1

In addition to adopting and publishing this we also need to update/obsolete to 
make ML-KEM MUST implement.

Cheers,
John

From: Rebecca Guthrie <rmgu...@uwe.nsa.gov>
Date: Friday, 6 December 2024 at 18:47
To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>, 
ipsec@ietf.org <ipsec@ietf.org>
Cc: John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>, Kampanakis, Panos 
<kpa...@amazon.com>, Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi>
Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt
You don't often get email from rmgu...@uwe.nsa.gov. Learn why this is 
important<https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
+1; I expected to see an adoption call issued before Dublin after several folks 
expressed support for a call (following 
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/G-7lcrHXSm60gjvY4UupBCiBlwM/)

Rebecca

Rebecca Guthrie
she/her
Center for Cybersecurity Standards (CCSS)
Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC)
National Security Agency (NSA)

From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>
Sent: Thursday, December 5, 2024 3:28 PM
To: Rebecca Guthrie (GOV) <rmgu...@uwe.nsa.gov>; ipsec@ietf.org
Cc: John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>; Kampanakis, Panos 
<kpa...@amazon.com>
Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt

Going over this again: is there a specific reason we should *not* adopt this 
draft?  We (at least, the people concerned about PQ security) need it, and I do 
not see any downsides to this straightforward draft.

If there are no objections, what do we do to move this draft forward?

From: Rebecca Guthrie 
<rmguthr=40uwe.nsa....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:rmguthr=40uwe.nsa....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2024 6:09 AM
To: ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
Cc: John Mattsson 
<john.matts...@ericsson.com<mailto:john.matts...@ericsson.com>>; Scott Fluhrer 
(sfluhrer) <sfluh...@cisco.com<mailto:sfluh...@cisco.com>>; Kampanakis, Panos 
<kpa...@amazon.com<mailto:kpa...@amazon.com>>
Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt

I also support working group adoption

Rebecca Guthrie
she/her
Center for Cybersecurity Standards (CCSS)
Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC)
National Security Agency (NSA)

From: John Mattsson 
<john.mattsson=40ericsson....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:john.mattsson=40ericsson....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 5:30 PM
To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) 
<sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>>;
 Kampanakis, Panos 
<kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org>>;
 ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
Subject: [IPsec] Re: New Version Notification for 
draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt

>I would like to second the request to make this a working group item.
+1

From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) 
<sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:sfluhrer=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Date: Monday, 4 November 2024 at 18:23
To: Kampanakis, Panos 
<kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org>>,
 ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org> <ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>>
Subject: [IPsec] Re: New Version Notification for 
draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt
I would like to second the request to make this a working group item.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kampanakis, Panos 
> <kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
> Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 12:15 PM
> To: ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
> Subject: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2-09.txt
>
> FYI, draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09 incorporates the last feedback for the
> -08 version except for the test vectors which I will add later.
>
> I would like to ask the WG to finalize the decision about leaving the draft 
> as-is
> and using the already assigned OIDs or adopting it as an IPSECME WG item.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-dra...@ietf.org<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org> 
> <internet-dra...@ietf.org<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>>
> Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 11:52 AM
> To: Ravago, Gerardo <g...@amazon.com<mailto:g...@amazon.com>>; Kampanakis, 
> Panos
> <kpa...@amazon.com<mailto:kpa...@amazon.com>>
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2-09.txt
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click
> links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the
> content is safe.
>
>
>
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt has
> been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF
> repository.
>
> Name:     draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2
> Revision: 09
> Title:    Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key
> Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
> Date:     2024-11-04
> Group:    Individual Submission
> Pages:    10
> URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt
> Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2/
> HTML:     
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.html<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2->
> 09.html
> HTMLized: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem->
> ikev2
> Diff:     
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09<https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem->
> ikev2-09
>
> Abstract:
>
>    NIST recently standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism,
>    which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment.  This
>    draft specifies how to use ML-KEM as an additional key exchange in
>    IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges.  This Post-Quantum
>    Traditional Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism approach allows for
>    negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against
>    cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers and theoretical
>    weaknesses in ML-KEM.
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
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