I would like to second the request to make this a working group item.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 12:15 PM
> To: ipsec@ietf.org
> Subject: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2-09.txt
> 
> FYI, draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09 incorporates the last feedback for the
> -08 version except for the test vectors which I will add later.
> 
> I would like to ask the WG to finalize the decision about leaving the draft 
> as-is
> and using the already assigned OIDs or adopting it as an IPSECME WG item.
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 11:52 AM
> To: Ravago, Gerardo <g...@amazon.com>; Kampanakis, Panos
> <kpa...@amazon.com>
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2-09.txt
> 
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click
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> 
> 
> 
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt has
> been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF
> repository.
> 
> Name:     draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2
> Revision: 09
> Title:    Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key
> Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
> Date:     2024-11-04
> Group:    Individual Submission
> Pages:    10
> URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt
> Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2/
> HTML:     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-
> 09.html
> HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2
> Diff:     https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-
> ikev2-09
> 
> Abstract:
> 
>    NIST recently standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism,
>    which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment.  This
>    draft specifies how to use ML-KEM as an additional key exchange in
>    IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges.  This Post-Quantum
>    Traditional Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism approach allows for
>    negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against
>    cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers and theoretical
>    weaknesses in ML-KEM.
> 
> 
> 
> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> 
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