I would like to second the request to make this a working group item.
> -----Original Message----- > From: Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=40amazon....@dmarc.ietf.org> > Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 12:15 PM > To: ipsec@ietf.org > Subject: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2-09.txt > > FYI, draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09 incorporates the last feedback for the > -08 version except for the test vectors which I will add later. > > I would like to ask the WG to finalize the decision about leaving the draft > as-is > and using the already assigned OIDs or adopting it as an IPSECME WG item. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org> > Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 11:52 AM > To: Ravago, Gerardo <g...@amazon.com>; Kampanakis, Panos > <kpa...@amazon.com> > Subject: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2-09.txt > > CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click > links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the > content is safe. > > > > A new version of Internet-Draft draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt has > been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF > repository. > > Name: draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2 > Revision: 09 > Title: Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key > Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) > Date: 2024-11-04 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 10 > URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2/ > HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2- > 09.html > HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2 > Diff: https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2-09 > > Abstract: > > NIST recently standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism, > which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment. This > draft specifies how to use ML-KEM as an additional key exchange in > IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges. This Post-Quantum > Traditional Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism approach allows for > negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against > cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers and theoretical > weaknesses in ML-KEM. > > > > The IETF Secretariat > > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list -- ipsec@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to ipsec-le...@ietf.org _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list -- ipsec@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to ipsec-le...@ietf.org