Hi Scott,

> > > Actually, it does add value from a crypto point of view, at least from a
> > specific attack.  In a multitarget attack, that is, an attack where we 
> > assume
> > that the attacker has encrypted packets from a large number of SAs, and his
> > goal is to recover the keys for any one of the encrypted packets, here is 
> > what
> > the attacker can do (assuming GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305); if he has packet
> > encrypted with each SA with the same nonce, he can guess a key, and
> > generate the internal GCM/ChaCha20 keystream based on that key/nonce
> > combination.  He can then scan through all the packets to see if the
> > encryption makes sense (or the ICV tag works out); this can be done far
> > faster than checking each packet individually.  Assuming the packets are
> > encrypted with AES-128, and the attacker has packets from 2**L SAs, then
> > against this attack, we have only 128-L bits of security.
> > >
> > > By including 32 bits of unpredictable values, we make this attack 4 
> > > billion
> > times harder, and for AES-128, that would give us 160-L bits of security. 
> > This
> > doesn't actually add any security against attacks against a single SA, and 
> > the
> > salt doesn't actually need to be secret.

Thank you for the good explanation.

> > Thanks for clarification. I guess I have been thinking too SA centric.
> > In fact we always discussed AES-256 only.
> >
> > Do you agree that starting the window/sender IDs with random offsets
> > would fix this weakness?
> 
> Yes, it would address this weakness.  On the other hand, with AES-256, you 
> don't really need this anyways...

What's your opinion - if we consider quantum computers (so that the real 
strength of AES-256 is 128 bit),
then does addition of unpredicted salt to AES-256 make sense?

Regards,
Valery.

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