I think this argument implicitly assumes unicast.

Rich Graveman

On Thu, Nov 12, 2009 at 8:18 PM, Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
<manav.bha...@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote:
> Daniel,
>
>> AH is a security feature we need to keep for header authentication
>
> Am really not sure about the value that AH adds even in case of header 
> authentication.
>
> So what fields does AH protect:
>
> Version, Payload length, Next Header, Source IP and dest IP
>
> The only field worth modifying is the source and the dest IP. Now note that 
> an IPSec SA is established between a pair of source IP and dest IP. Upon 
> receipt of a packet containing an AH header, the receiver determines the 
> appropriate (unidirectional) SA, based on the dest IP, security protocol 
> (AH), and the SPI (it could also include the source IP). If the attacker 
> modifies (or spoofs) either of the source or the dest IP, the SA lookup will 
> fail and the receiver will regardless discard the packet. So what are we 
> gaining by AH "header authentication"?
>
> AH can only add value over ESP-NULL if there are instances where despite 
> address spoofing we erroneously process the IPSec packet. I don't see that 
> happening, so is this really an issue?
>
> Cheers, Manav
> ________________________________
>
>        From: Daniel Migault [mailto:mglt.i...@gmail.com]
>        Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 11.14 AM
>        To: Jack Kohn
>        Cc: Stephen Kent; ipsec@ietf.org; Bhatia, Manav (Manav); Merike Kaeo
>        Subject: Re: [IPsec] WESP - Roadmap Ahead
>
>        On Thu, Nov 12, 2009 at 5:30 AM, Jack Kohn <kohn.j...@gmail.com> wrote:
>                >
>                > Whoops, I was wrong. I looked at 4552 and they do cite 
> ESP-NULL (although
>                > they never refer to it that way) as a MUST, and AH as a MAY.
>
>                Ok, so can we work on deprecating AH? This way new standards 
> defined
>                in other WGs dont have to provide support for AH.
>
>
>        AH is a security feature we need to keep for header authentication. 
> Other WG may chose not to deal with AH and only consider ESP. I don't see 
> what's wrong with that?
>
>         Regards
>
>        Daniel
>        --
>        Daniel Migault
>        Orange Labs -- Security
>        +33 6 70 72 69 58
>
>
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