Deleted without reading...

On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 9:09 AM, li...@rhsoft.net <li...@rhsoft.net> wrote:

>
>
> Am 05.12.2017 um 17:45 schrieb Walter Parker:
>
>> Lists, I give you the same advice. I know and use SSL Labs, I been a
>> subscriber to Ivan's mailing list for years. Older versions of Openssl had
>> a default list of +ALL, -aNULL, -eNULL as the default list of ciphers
>>
>
> yes
>
> Before DES was removed in the new versions of openssl, that means the list
>> included things like DES and RC4
>>
>
> don't matter because no somehow recent client would have negotiated
> DES/RC4 with a config like below even if the SSLCipherSuite would contain
> RC4/DES at the end of the list
>
> SSLHonorCipherOrder On
> SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:
> ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:
> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDH
> E-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-
> ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-
> AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:
> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-
> GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:
> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:
> AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA
>
> That is why server admins always spelled out long lists of ciphers, to
>> guarantee that weak ciphers would not appear on older installs. I found
>> this information by reading the code bases themselves, where did you find
>> your information?
>>
>
> frankly you are saying exactly the same as i did
>
> the point is that for nearly a deacde servers take care of negotiated
> ciphers and when tomorrow one of them like AES-CBC with several
> vulerabilities in the past years becomes problematic like you even was
> advised to prefer RC4 instead block-ciphers for the timewinodow of a large
> amount unfixed clients you can as serveradmin migitate the problem
>
> but only if the client is not PHP which thinks to outsmart client openssl
> as well as servers configuration
>
> this also makes initiatives like https://fedoraproject.org/wiki
> /Changes/CryptoPolicy useless and everything reacts faster than wait for
> the next PHP point release!
>
> I'm done with you. You don't understand and worse you don't want to
>> understand but think you understand. You just admitted to that. Please stop
>> until you get proper training as someone else on this list might make the
>> same mistakes that you are
>>
> yes, please stop to repsond to any of my mails, especially stop offlist
> mails
>
>
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>
>


-- 
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.   -- Justice Louis D. Brandeis

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