Hi Raju,,
do u have an idea of how to configure a PPPOE server in linux. the client for this 
srever can be linuxx or non linux based 

please help .. it is very urgent
----- Original Message -----
From: Raju Mathur <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2002 10:15:16 +0530
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ilugd]: (fwd) Apache mod_ssl off-by-one vulnerability


> [Phew, sure a big day for vulnerability reports!  Please upgrade
> mod_ssl in Apache if you have installed it (note: apparently mod_ssl
> doesn't need to be enabled in a virtual host for your server to be
> vulnerable) -- Raju]
> 
> This is an RFC 1153 digest.
> (1 message)
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> From: Jedi/Sector One <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Apache mod_ssl off-by-one vulnerability
> Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 22:46:47 +0159
> 
> 
> Product: mod_ssl - http://www.modssl.org/
> Date: 06/24/2002
> Summary: Off-by-one in mod_ssl 2.4.9 and earlier
> By: Frank Denis - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                                  DESCRIPTION
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> This module provides strong cryptography for the Apache 1.3 webserver via the
> Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
> protocols by the help of the Open Source SSL/TLS toolkit OpenSSL, which is
> based on SSLeay from Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson.
> 
> The mod_ssl package was created in April 1998 by Ralf S. Engelschall and was
> originally derived from software developed by Ben Laurie for use in the
> Apache-SSL HTTP server project. The mod_ssl package is licensed under a
> BSD-style license, which basically means that you are free to get and use it
> for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                                 VULNERABILITY
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> The Apache web server provides an extended API (EAPI) to easily extended the
> server with third-party modules, through various hooks called as needed. One
> of these hooks, rewrite_command, is called right after a configuration
> directive line was read and before it is processed.
> 
> mod_ssl registers such a rewrite_command hook when backward compatibility is
> enabled. The ssl_compat_directive() is called for every line read in a
> configuration file.
> 
> However, this function contains an off-by-one error in this code snippet :
> 
>   ...
>   char *cp;
>   char caCmd[1024];
>   char *cpArgs;
>   ...
>   cp = (char *)oline;
>   for (i = 0; *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t' && *cp != NUL && i < 1024; )
>                                                          ^^^^^^^^
>     caCmd[i++] = *cp++;
>   caCmd[i] = NUL;
>   cpArgs = cp;
>   ...
> 
> oline is a pointer to a line being parsed, and whoose content can be
> arbitrary long, and controlled by untrusted users through ".htaccess" files.
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                                    IMPACT
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> Apart from global configuration files, Apache allows per-directory
> configuration files. Therefore, the bug can be triggered by any regular user
> through specially crafted ".htaccess" files.
> 
> The stack can be smashed. Alexander Yurchenko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a
> proof of concept exploit for OpenBSD to demonstrate that arbitrary code could
> be executed through ".htaccess" files.
> 
> As noticed by Michal Zalewski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, you can cause an
> overflow in every child running to force all of them do what you want. This
> is way more dangerous than children forked for CGI execution.
> 
> Possible implications include denial of service (by sending STOP signals to
> every child), adding fake entries to every log file (not only those from the
> virtualhost the .htaccess lies in), running arbitrary commands as the web
> server user regardless of ExecCGI and suexec settings and spoofing replies.
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                              VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> Any system running the Apache web server with mod_ssl compiled in, and the
> "AllowOverride" directive not set to "None" for virtual hosts may be
> vulnerable if virtual hosts are managed by untrusted users.
> 
> Systems may be vulnerable even if no virtual host actually use SSL features,
> as long as mod_ssl is compiled in.
> 
> Apache 2.0 doesn't seem to ship this part of the mod_ssl source code and it
> is therefore not vulnerable.
> 
> mod_ssl compiled without backward compatibility is not vulnerable. However,
> this feature is enabled by default.
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                                  WORKAROUND
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> Disallow per-directory configuration files by only having 
> "AllowOverride None" directives in your httpd.conf file, and restart the web
> server.
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>                                     FIXES
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>     
> The mod_ssl development team was very reactive and a new version has just
> been released. mod_ssl 2.8.10 addresses the vulnerability and it is
> freely available from http://www.modssl.org/ . Upgrading from an earlier
> release is painless.
> 
> The bug has also been fixed in OpenBSD-current, thanks to fgsch.
> 
> The following oneliner patch also addresses the problem :
> 
> --- pkg.sslmod/ssl_engine_compat.c.orig       Sat Feb 23 19:45:23 2002
> +++ pkg.sslmod/ssl_engine_compat.c    Mon Jun 24 20:43:17 2002
> @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
>       * Extract directive name
>       */
>      cp = (char *)oline;
> -    for (i = 0; *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t' && *cp != NUL && i < 1024; )
> +    for (i = 0; *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t' && *cp != NUL && i < sizeof(caCmd) - 1; )
>          caCmd[i++] = *cp++;
>      caCmd[i] = NUL;
>      cpArgs = cp;
> 
> Best regards,
> 
>      -Frank.
> 
> -- 
>  __  /*-      Frank DENIS (Jedi/Sector One) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>     -*\  __
>  \ '/    <a href="http://www.PureFTPd.Org/"; target="_blank"> Secure FTP Server </a>  
>  \' /
>   \/  <a href="http://www.Jedi.Claranet.Fr/"; target="_blank"> Misc. free software 
></a>  \/
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> End of this Digest
> ******************
> 
> -- 
> Raju Mathur          [EMAIL PROTECTED]           http://kandalaya.org/
>                      It is the mind that moves
> 
>           ================================================
> To subscribe, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with subscribe in subject header
> To unsubscribe, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe in subject 
>header
> Archives are available at http://www.mail-archive.com/ilugd%40wpaa.org
>           =================================================
> 
> 

-- 
__________________________________________________________
Sign-up for your own FREE Personalized E-mail at Mail.com
http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup

Save up to $160 by signing up for NetZero Platinum Internet service.
http://www.netzero.net/?refcd=N2P0602NEP8

          ================================================
To subscribe, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with subscribe in subject header
To unsubscribe, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe in subject header
Archives are available at http://www.mail-archive.com/ilugd%40wpaa.org
          =================================================

Reply via email to