At 15:06 23.11.99 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Personally, I wouldn't have bothered with the triple-DES telnet >encryption mode, on the grounds that because it is a very weak mode, it >doesn't provide much protection. However, Jeffery lobbied for them on >the grounds that they were being used in some existing implementations >(I don't remember which one, but it wasn't Kerberos V5), and that we >should document what some implementations are using today. Protocols that offer increased complexity but no gain in security or efficiency over other standards-track efforts, but are in use today, are IMHO excellent candidates for Informational publication. Not for the standards track. Harald A -- Harald Tveit Alvestrand, EDB Maxware, Norway [EMAIL PROTECTED]
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option to Pro... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option t... Jeffrey Altman
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Opti... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication ... tytso
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Harald Tveit Alvestrand
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authen... William Allen Simpson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Assar Westerlund
- IP network address assignmen... Pete Loshin
- Re: IP network address a... Henning Schulzrinne
- RE: IP network address a... David Newman
- Re: IP network addre... Henning Schulzrinne
- Re: IP network addre... Christian Huitema
- Re: IP network address a... Bill Manning
- Re: IP network addre... Randy Bush
- Re: IP network addre... Brian E Carpenter