[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > However, Jeffery lobbied for them on the grounds that they were > being used in some existing implementations (I don't remember which > one, but it wasn't Kerberos V5), and that we should document what > some implementations are using today. I'm all for documenting things. What I'm trying to say is that there might be a danger in having situations where people think that just because it's using DES3 it's three times as secure, which might not be the case. /Johan
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option to Pro... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Option t... Jeffrey Altman
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication Opti... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authentication ... tytso
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Johan Danielsson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Harald Tveit Alvestrand
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authen... William Allen Simpson
- Re: Last Call: Telnet Authenticat... Assar Westerlund
- IP network address assignmen... Pete Loshin
- Re: IP network address a... Henning Schulzrinne
- RE: IP network address a... David Newman
- Re: IP network addre... Henning Schulzrinne
- Re: IP network addre... Christian Huitema
- Re: IP network address a... Bill Manning
- Re: IP network addre... Randy Bush