I'm convinced that "donotexplode" and "donotmodify" as documented in -02, is the right way to go. -Wei
On Sun, May 17, 2026 at 2:56 PM Bron Gondwana <brong= [email protected]> wrote: > Yeah, this sounds like a losing arms race of workarounds. > > a) I don't want you to forward this > b) but I really REALLY want to forward it, so I'm gonna do it anyway > c) ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ > > And then trying to come up with some policy work around to say "don't > forward it unless you really REALLY have to", in which case it's suddenly > OK. > > Unless (c) trusts (b) to be allowed to do forwarding of any random stuff > to it, this is going to cause pain. We can't design around that with > technological solutions, that's a real world trust relationship question. > And mostly, it's (c) that's going to have the relationship with (b), not > (a) - so asking (a) to put signals in the DNS or the headers, either one, > is pointless. > > Unless (as John said) someone can provide a real world non-trivial use > case for this, I think we're designing for ghosts here. A mechanism > without a constituency. > > Bron. > > On Sun, May 17, 2026, at 15:33, Richard Clayton wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > In message <[email protected] > il.com>, Wei Chuang <[email protected]> writes > > >> > I propose that the specification or BCP should say that MTAs that > >> > need to forward such null recipe, "donotmodify" or "donotexplode" > >> > messages onwards for whatever reasons, should delete all prior > >> > DKIM2 headers and re-sign the DKIM2 signature as themselves. This > >> > probably means that the above language needs to be tweaked for > >> > this. > >> > >> That is not good advice for "donotexplode" ! > >> > > > >So you'd be for the forensics approach. My worry, perhaps unfounded if > >everyone applies section 10.8, is that downstream receivers might > >misinterpret the earlier signatures. > > you missed my point ... it is perfectly OK to forward "donotexplode" > email unless you know that it has been exploded (which you may not > unless a later hop reports that it has done so) > > forwarding email that has been modified despite a "donotmodify" flag > will always be detectable and forwarding is very likely to end in tears > so if you must do so then yes, you are going to have to create an email > that is validly signed -- that might not involve discarding anything, > you could choose to wrap up the forwarded message in a MIME part and > send that along > > - -- > richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same > Still you never see the change from day to day > And no-one notices the customs slip away" > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 > > iQA/AwUBagoYFWHfC/FfW545EQLlZQCg3GdC+cBtYGYmqqD/dG2hqCD2/LsAn1YV > rSey1q/+RaaOoIWxNm6GcMNK > =LLSv > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > > -- > Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC > [email protected] > > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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