On Sun 17/Nov/2024 12:32:10 +0100 Richard Clayton wrote:
You will note that the outline DKIM2 spec says that an m= setting for
the very first DKIM2 signature can specify that an email must not be
modified or "exploded". Hence standards compliant systems would prevent
the attacks we currently see, and replay detection systems would get a
leg up in detecting malicious replays (and, by being able to identify
which entities have misbehaved, impact their reputation accordingly).
The DKIM2 design we have put forward has a number of these features that
we have put in to make it easier to tackle the problems that are
unnecessarily difficult to handle today.
It should also be noted that this is a good example of wickedness that
can only be identified and mitigated when operating "at scale".
The draft says something like this:
Since the "to" address is always encoded in the email, any email
to multiple recipients must be exploded by the sender, and each
copy signed separately with different headers.
I seemed to grasp that I can easily determine a replay by not recognizing the
encoded "To" address as mine. That can be detected on just one message, no?
Best
Ale
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