On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 11:11 AM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote:

>
> I've said in multiple threads that the current problem both in the charter
> and the problem draft are far too vague for us to address. Here are some
> from me at least:
>
>    1. Who are the victims? Just bulk senders? Are the bulk senders
>    signing using their domain?
>
> We've seen a variety of victims: bulk senders, trusted brands, EDUs etc.

>
>    1. If there are different types of senders who suffer from replay
>    attack reputation, are the attacks using the same or different techniques
>    to create the signed spam?
>
> Mostly the same, but spammers adjust their techniques to make things work.

>
>    1. Do senders filter outbound traffic for spam?
>    2. Do spammers who get a piece of email signed by a sender also send
>    mail to target domains to see if it passes their filters?
>    3. What are the characteristics of the spammer wrt to the sending
>    domain? Are they brand new accounts or established ones?
>    4. Do sending domains keep track of users who are sending spam in the
>    eyes of their filters? Do they correlate that with other characteristics of
>    their users such as freshness?
>    5. Do senders pay any attention to the To domain?
>    6. Do receivers pay attention to the To domain(s)?
>    7. Does the To domain spammers use remain more or less static, or do
>    they mutate at a high rate?
>
> We (Gmail) saw spammers frequently duplicate the To headers so they could
personalize them per recipient. RFC 5322 (duplicate header rejection) and
oversigning is effective against this.

>
>    1. Can we quantify the reputation bump (or hit) on the receiver from
>    these spam bursts? (I'm sure the spammers know the answer to this)
>
> The reputation drop is quite significant for smaller senders (so spammers
rotate through them). For larger senders we also will eventually see large
drops.

>
>    1. Do spammers with a replay server sign and/or set up SPF records for
>    their spam sending domain?
>
> They mostly set up SPF records for the replay servers. They aggressively
shard between many different new SPFs.

>
>    1. Do spammers provide an unsubscribe link which is typical on normal
>    email blasts? If not, is that unusual and/or against the rules of the bulk
>    provider? If so can the sender keep track of that?
>    2. Can senders verify that opt-out links actually work especially for
>    new accounts?
>    3. Can filters be adjusted at a more fine grain in the face of
>    different conditions? That is, accept a higher false positive rate in
>    certain conditions?
>    4. Are there receivers out there that treat an x= expired message
>    different than a missing or broken signature? It's ambiguous in the DKIM
>    text about that, I think.
>    5. Can receivers take advantage of the signalling of a small x= value
>    as also a clue that the sender is concerned about replays?
>    6. Do receivers use things like unsigned Subject or To or other
>    tell-tale fields as signs of a bulk replay?
>    7. Do receivers collect and use reputation information on mailing
>    lists and other indirect flows that resign their messages?
>
> The challenge with this is the long tail of mailing lists and indirect
flows, not all of which indicate their indirectness in an obvious way.

>
>    1. What percent of incoming email to a mailbox is through resenders
>    and of that what percent resign?
>    2. Do receivers keep tabs on which users are using things like mailing
>    lists to differentiate users who expect to get indirect mail vs those who
>    don't?
>
> I know that some of these have been answered to some degree or another,
> but wanted to put them in one thread so they can be added to the problem
> draft easier as needed.
>
> Also: to the degree that some of these questions can't be answered or only
> very vaguely is its own answer as to what this wg can and can't do. Some
> might be just nice to have, but some might be more foundational.
>
> Feel free to add to my list because I'm sure it's far from comprehensive.
>
> Mike
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf-dkim mailing list
> Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
>
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list
Ietf-dkim@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim

Reply via email to