On Mon, May 12, 2025 at 01:11:15PM -0400, Greg Hogan wrote:
> On Mon, May 12, 2025 at 12:23 PM Rutherther <ruthert...@ditigal.xyz> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Greg,
> >
> > Greg Hogan <c...@greghogan.com> writes:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 5:55 PM Steve George <st...@futurile.net> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> I hope the initial user experience wouldn't be to "break on the user's 
> > >> first pull", since with annual releases we wouldn't have release 
> > >> artefacts that are 2.5 years out of date. And, we'd also degraft 
> > >> regularly which would be beneficial for all users.
> > >>
> > >> As you can tell I would _love_ us to be able to have a slower moving 
> > >> branch, but purposefully have kept the GCD more limited. For now 
> > >> focusing on the step forward of regular releases.
> > >
> > > I have not updated a 2.5+ year old Guix system, but what is the issue
> > > here? How is this any different from updating a week old system? If
> > > the archive contains broken packages then the user upgrade experience
> > > will fail just the same. And clearing the archive of broken packages
> > > also breaks user manifests!
> >
> > There isn't an issue as long as you use substitutes. But if you decided
> > you won't, then there is an issue currently. Specifically there is a
> > misbehaving mirror crysys.hu that returns 200, but returns page not
> > found html page. That means packages like gnutls aren't building. For
> > people that are installing Guix from their system's package manager,
> > they will get hit by this unless they actively activate the substitutes.
> >
> > This points to a more general problem that can be happening in the
> > future, it can be misbehaving mirrors or pages that aren't handled well
> > by Guix and lead to non-buildable software. As long as pages behave as
> > they should, everything should be fine, ie. SWH gets triggered on
> > missing repositories, subsequent mirror urls are used, etc. But
> > misbehaving pages are always going to cause issues.
> 
> So for the (small?) subset of users (myself included) who do not
> enable substitutes, then for the small set of packages provided
> pre-built with the installation ...
> 
> >> guix depends on gnutls
> guix@1.4.0-36.0772d36
> guile-gnutls@4.0.0
> gnutls@3.8.3
> 
> Can we not retry mirrors on checksum mismatch? And differentiate
> between binary substitutes and sources? The latter are strongly hashed
> and therefore no different from patches or the package code itself.
> Does use of SWH require substitutes to be enabled?

SWH doesn't require substitutes to be enabled, they only serve source
files.

> > Apart from that there has been a mistake made in generation of the 1.4.0
> > iso, the iso has used a local channel url, /home/ludo/..., so now if you
> > install from the iso, your system will have this path in the
> > channels.scm provenance file. Then if you do not pull at all, but
> > reconfigure right away, you will get an error that /home/ludo/... is not
> > found. That is because of the forward update check that is going to try
> > to check if your current commit is descendant of the previous one.
> > (I think that the check should have a way to abort early if no
> > commits have changed btw)
> > Mistakes like that will probably be happening with new releases
> > as well. Though this one should be impossible already - the url is going
> > to be replaced in the operating-system from install.scm.
> >
> > The more releases the faster issues like this can get resolved, and not
> > confuse the users.
> 
> I think we should release more often (multiple times per year) and
> also add checks like building  release artifacts and bootstrapping
> systems with clocks set into the future to detect another major
> annoyance: timebombs. Anything which can be automated.

These are still things that we can do.  I hope that any manual parts of
the release process we can identify and automate going forward,
including making sure any package or service we offer from the installer
actually builds.

> > Regards
> > Rutherther
> 

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Efraim Flashner   <efr...@flashner.co.il>   אפרים פלשנר
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