On 17/08/14 11:57, Werner Koch wrote: > Using this feature it is possible to keep the entire RFC-822 based mail > infrastructure while using a different transport mechanism. This can be > done mostly transparent for existing applications using a private or > corporate gateways.
So basically what you're suggesting is: - MUA's still work with RFC-822 based mail, with a sort of "dummy" envelope that holds an encrypted MIME message/rfc822 inside with the real metadata. These MUA's still talk IMAP and SMTP. - We define a new transport; the message the MUA hands via SMTP is not sent on with SMTP, but with a different transport that's not quite as leaky with metadata. This transport ultimately delivers the message to a mailbox server allowing access over IMAP for the MUA. Did I interpret it correctly? Regards, Peter. BTW: I still think hop-by-hop encryption with TLS, with the certificates authenticated through something different than the CA system, goes a long way in thwarting mass surveilance. For massive, passive data trawling surveilance, even the CA system combined with ephemeral TLS keying might be enough, since it requires a MITM to intercept TLS with a fake certificate. Ephemeral keys just to be on the safe side :). -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
