-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi
On Wednesday 29 January 2014 at 7:57:12 PM, in <mid:6757499.FAIGtOWeFj@mani>, Johannes Zarl wrote: > Under the assumption > that an attacker can't reliably do a MITM attack on > every message that is sent over an extended time > period Why would that be assumed? In a corporate setting the MITM could be placed within the company's network, for a home user their ISP or email provider could be used, and for mobiles, the phone network. > , you would place almost no trust in a fresh > persona-certified key, but high trust in an old and > frequently encountered key. The older the key, the greater the opportunity for compromise. > The trust would grow with > time (just like the trust into someone you know in real > life). If a person I knew well in real life were "compromised" they are likely a poor enough actor for it to be easily-noticed. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net The second mouse gets the cheese -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlLplxVXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5p/PAEAMLzMDuW9+rogvLcrYKTKPZOZDyfj3CwaG+l h5IjlkH1I+wsYooLti/c8hBklE1RxHXlbDjnmjph88IAK2+hHvBtC+HUra+2BZbp KxDeYvthnSeeZ7R1Ry3yX9c7OUO4J2xAZPCVTFmmBoX06jf/nBBHQGAelmnrTF5L dXkfQPTu =8zBv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users