On Thursday 05 December 2013 19:47:57 Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Do 05.12.2013, 19:30:07 schrieb Ingo Klöcker: > > your assertion is correct. > > > > > > In the first scenario > > > > > > a) the key has been compromised and revoked and you don't know > > > > that > > > > (because your last certificate update was before the revocation > > > > publishing) > > > > it is incorrect because the attacker cannot extend the validity of > > the revoked key. > > You misunderstand the attack.
No. I don't. :-) The attack involving control over the system time came up later in the thread. For every countermeasure there is an attack that circumvents this countermeasure, bribery and torture probably being the most effective attacks. But this doesn't mean that your argument for using key expiration, i.e. to "force" the users of the key to update the key regularly, is wrong. It just means that your argument doesn't work if your adversary can control your system clock. OTOH, your argument works if the key has been compromised by an adversary like me and you, e.g. by a colleague of the key owner (who does not happen to work for a three letter organization). Regards, Ingo
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