Am Fr 25.10.2013, 23:45:50 schrieb Johan Wevers: > Further, if they expect it to be secure for only 25 years,
This means that every single key is secure over that time. It means that after 25 years organizations with huge resources may be able to crack a *single* key in a lot of time (rather a year than a day). So even within the next 35 years THEY have to make a very small selection which keys they want to break as then there will be a few million 2048-bit keys around. And that requires that the law doesn't change within that time, forcing the agencies to delete most of the stored encrypted data. The US government is just realizing that their current approach causes costs beside those in the budget. And we have not even talked about the different security levels of keys. The default setting of gpg should be suitable for normal keys i.e. keys for everyday communication. If you need a high security key then you need to know a lot about IT security anyway because the keys are the strongest part of the system. Those who know how to do the rest right obviously know whether and how to increase the key size. Why should anyone 25+ years from now spend a huge amount of resources in order to read a tiny part of today's everyday communication (or a big part in 40 years)? That makes absolutely no sense. How do you want to explain that in a democracy, "hunting terrorists"? Hauke -- Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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