On Tuesday 22 of May 2012 13:34:20 da...@gbenet.com wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 22/05/12 09:58, tim.kac...@gmail.com wrote: > > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. > > From what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with > > the key length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > > > > I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than > > 3072 for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is > > unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people > > saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could > > reasonably need, but I am skeptical. > > > > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? > > well as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we > > aren't just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies > > put together. An entire global class of people. You can argue that > > they may be uninterested in me, however I don't buy that argument at > > all because they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a thousand > > dollars at least on me personally at this point I am sure in policing > > costs to try to survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. > > > > The eviction alone at my occupy cost (probably greatly) in excess of > > > > $16,000 to arrest 8 people, and involved almost 200 cops for 4 hours. > > There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is > > actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, > > homeland security, fbi what have you. And that exludes any thugs the > > bankers put in the crowd as privately hired types. > > > > Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the relatively > > distant future. Given the sort of crap the 1% do wrt murdering and > > maiming vast quantites of people for a couple extra bucks I would not be > > the least bit surprised if 20 years from now they "dissapeared" me > > because I passed our some pamphlets that said "end class war now". > > > > An enemy is an enemy, and enemies must be smooshed, right? Why take > > risks> > > like letting an innocent person live if they might concievable scratch > > your gravy train at some point in the future? Abductions and bullets > > aren't that expensive once you got everything all set up, it's a good > > investement. > > > > > > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have > > the best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A > > couple hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per > > message for a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice > > frankly. Is that not what we are looking at? > > > > And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant > > spyware on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant > > spyware on everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp > > up and probably store indefinitely all text -and many other- > > communications on the internet (carnivore etc.). In the future, data > > they don't have they can't use. There is always a substantial > > probability that they will not get my keys with spyware, and I would > > like capitalize (If you'll pardon me) on that. > > > > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. > > > > I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be > > included in the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, > > like a table that shows how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key > > with > > 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your > > adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are > > suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of > > quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. > > > > I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a > > relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the > > norm > > to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption > > being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the > > rest.of your security worries. > > > > My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought > > I > > could just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really > > include the safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of > > people who are doing more serious stuff in the class war than little ol' > > me (which isn't hard). > > > > Links: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 > > -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in > > 1998 http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in > > particular makes it clear that it is not unreasonable for someone in my > > position to choose a 4096 bit key. > > > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. > > Government requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. > > A 3072 bit RSA or elGamal key is about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric > > key, right? And a 256 bit key length equivalent public key is abut > > 15,387 bits.. I think if people want to use the same level of > > encryption for their data that the government uses shouldn't that be > > supported at least in command line mode? > > http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on > > equivalencies > > in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Some say that all the power of the universe - and all the time its been in > existence will not crack a 2048 bit key with a secure passphrase. So by > the time the universe is well and truly over and some poor sod of a > government agent is alive and well he will not have cracked yer e-mails > or indeed any encrypted data. Can you imagine that power from a computer? > No. The mind boggles at the energy it would consume - a million million > million ad infinitum suns. > > But they "key" to all this is them holding your private key - it would be > quicker and a lot simpler to crush your balls with a pair of pliers - you > will give up your most treasured possession - your passphrase. This is > the meaning of brute force attacks on your key. > > The strength of your passphrase is critical alpha numerics take the whole > universe to crack where as a phrase like: > > "marymary&%/*had*)/+a:+=little$£"KL$Donkey#*hadxxxabad%$*JHGbadIUNG6**leg^ > )andalways@#][a\|little-0UHKTwalkedUKL:@?^wonkey > > > is a good key it will last you forever - if you can stand having your > balls crushed. So the best form of security would be to invest in a > sturdy steel codpiece and a long passphrase. > > David
"everything that could be invented has been invented" "640k ought to be enough for anybody" Do we really have to repeat the history? Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
