Hi David, * David Shaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [06. Dez. 2005]: > On Fri, Dec 02, 2005 at 01:10:01PM +0100, Gregor Zattler wrote: > > * David Shaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [30. Nov. 2005]: > > > On Wed, Nov 30, 2005 at 08:11:44PM +0100, Gregor Zattler wrote: > > O.k. it's not very likely that an attacker is able to surround > > all the people which keys I signed with people deliberately > > signing wrong keys to trick me. OTOH I can not be certain that > > Charlie, Nate and George know what they are doing when signing a > > key. But... > > Yes, exactly. 1 hop away is easy, but as you get further and further > away, you just don't know the people any longer.
Yes, ... but ... > > > GPG will calculate trust for 5 hops along the path, by default. You > > > can tune this with --max-cert-depth. > > > > How then is gpg able to calculate trust paths with more than one > > hop? > > The same way it calculates for one hop: fully valid keys with full > trust can make other keys fully valid. It doesn't matter if they are > one hop or 15 hops away, so long as the hop count is less than > --max-cert-depth. Isn't that the same issue as diskussed above? What's your --max-cert-depth? Ciao, Gregor -- -... --- .-. . -.. ..--.. ...-.- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
