Hi David, * David Shaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [30. Nov. 2005]: > On Wed, Nov 30, 2005 at 08:11:44PM +0100, Gregor Zattler wrote: > > * David Shaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [30. Nov. 2005]: > > > On Wed, Nov 30, 2005 at 04:29:21PM +0100, Gregor Zattler wrote: > > > > * David Shaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [28. Nov. 2005]: > > > > > On Sat, Nov 26, 2005 at 12:56:16AM +0100, Jaap Eldering wrote: > > > > > Yes, it is. There are a few servers that do more or less what you > > > > > describe (for example http://www.lysator.liu.se/~jc/wotsap/). It's > > > > > useful to see the various paths, but unless you trust each step in the > > > > > chain, it doesn't really help you get trust in the end point. > > > > > > > > Doesn't it help if there are several disjunct paths? Couldn't I > > > > say I trust a User-Id if more than n discunct paths of trust > > > > exist from my key to the other? > > > > > > Yes, if you trust those disjunct paths :) A hundred disjunct paths > > > that you don't trust don't help much. > > > > Why not? The disjunct paths from my key to the target key > > all start with keys signed by me. So all owners of this said > > keys must be part of an conspiracy. If I met the different key > > owners in different contextes this isn't very likely to happen. > > Unless you're talking about paths with only one hop, it doesn't work. > The paths *start* with keys signed by you. After that, you have no > assurance. > > Given these paths: > > Gregor -> Alice -> Baker -> Charlie -> David > Gregor -> Lorina -> Mark -> Nate -> David > Gregor -> Edith -> Frank -> George -> David > > You know (because you signed them), that Alice, Lorina, and Edith are > valid. Lets say that you also fully trust them to make good > signatures, so that makes Baker, Mark, and Frank fully valid as well. > However, not knowing how well Baker, Mark, or Frank issue signatures > stops you from making Charlie, Nate or George valid, which stops you > in turn from making my key valid.
O.k. it's not very likely that an attacker is able to surround all the people which keys I signed with people deliberately signing wrong keys to trick me. OTOH I can not be certain that Charlie, Nate and George know what they are doing when signing a key. But... [...] > > !? Does gpg calculate trust several hops along the trust path? > > GPG will calculate trust for 5 hops along the path, by default. You > can tune this with --max-cert-depth. How then is gpg able to calculate trust paths with more than one hop? Ciao, Gregor -- -... --- .-. . -.. ..--.. ...-.- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
