On Thursday, August 18, 2011 06:01:08 PM Grant wrote:
> >> >> > You can seperate the backups by giving each system a
> >> >> > different
> >> >> > account
> >> >> > where to store the backups.
> >> >> 
> >> >> I'm not sure what you mean.  The backups are all stored on the
> >> >> backup
> >> >> server.
> >> > 
> >> > Each machine to be backed up has a different account on the backup
> >> > server. This will prevent machine A from accessing the backups of
> >> > machine B.
> >> > 
> >> > This way, if one machine is compromised, only this machines
> >> > backups can be accessed using the access-keys for the backup. And
> >> > this machines keys can then be revoked without affecting other
> >> > backups.
> >> 
> >> That's a great idea.  I will do that.  Should that backup account have
> >> any special configuration, or just a standard new user?
> > 
> > I would suspect just a standard new user with default permissions.
> > Eg. only write-access to his/her own files.
> > 
> > And I'd prevent that user account from being able to get a
> > shell-account.
> 
> I created the backup users and everything works as long as the backup
> users have shells on the backup server and are listed in AllowUsers in
> /etc/ssh/sshd_config on the backup server.  Did I do something wrong
> or should the backup users need shells and to be listed in AllowUsers?

I'm not too familiar with rsync backups. A shell might be required, but if you 
set the command run on the server-side in the "authorized_keys" it should 
prevent any other command from being run.

> Should I set up any extra restrictions for them in sshd_config?

I have disabled all password-logins and only allow shared-key logins.

> Should I set passwords for them?

I don't set passwords for these type of users. By default, they can not login 
with any password that way. Setting a password will leave the possibility open 
someone might randomly guess the password.

--
Joost

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