This response addresses the comments directed at
the OAM Requirements draft.  Please see inline for responses
(or questions if necessary).

-- draft-ietf-mpls-oam-requirements-06.txt

I found a significant number of typos and English language
editorial cleanup nits that I'll leave to the RFC Editor to
address.  It might be good to alert the RFC Editor that this
draft is likely to require heavy editorial attention.

Section 2.1 Terminology - Both "Head-end Label Switch
Router (LSR)" and "Head-end Label Switching Router (LSR)"
are defined.  Only one of these two definitions should be
used - the other should be removed.

Section 2.2 Acronyms -

   LSP:  Label Switch Path

   LSR:  Label Switch Router

I suspect those should be "Label Switched Path" and "Label
Switching Router".  In any case, between this and the previous
comment, consistency on whether "LS" in acronyms stands for
"Label Switch" vs. "Label Switched" and/or "Label Switching"
is needed throughout the draft.

        Changed LSR to "Label Switching Router" and LSP to
"Label Switched Path" as per RFC3031 and also globally
made things consistent throughout the document.

Section 3 Motivations - RFC 2119 terminology is not appropriate
in this section, as it does not express requirements.  Change
all occurrences of "MAY" to "may".

        Fixed: MAY -> may

The statement that:

   However as of this writing, existing drafts focus on single
   provider solutions or focus on a single aspect of the MPLS
   architecture or application of MPLS.

appears to be inconsistent with Section 4.9's discussion of
standard MPLS MIBs, which includes references to the RFCs that
specify them.  In addition, this statement will be dramatically
incorrect when the LSP Ping draft is published.  It should be
rewritten to be more about the drafts that respond to these
requirements rather than a criticism of what has gone before.

        I think this is short and sweet and no longer has
the conflicts you mentioned:

3.  Motivations

   This document was created in order to provide requirements
   which could be used to create consistent and useful OAM
   functionality that meets operational requirements of those
   service providers who have or are deploying MPLS.


Section 4.1 Detection of Label Switched Path Defects

The characterization of "reasonable amount of time" for
detection as "both predictable and consistent" is incomplete.
For example, always detecting defects 47-48 hours after they
manifest in customer traffic is "both predictable and
consistent", but not "reasonable".

        That is true; however, the discussion of how "reasonable"
or "acceptable" is defined, is really based on the provider and
the SLA offered to the customer in question.

A ballpark/approximate
order-of-magnitude discussion should be added covering the
time frames in which LSP defects will likely affect customer
traffic, and the detection timeframes required for operator
detection to precede customers noticing that something is
wrong.

        I hope this makes things clearer. In Particular, see the last
two sentences:

   4.1 Detection of Label Switched Path Defects

   The ability to detect defects in a broken Label Switched Path
   (LSP) SHOULD not require manual hop-by-hop troubleshooting of
   each LSR used to switch traffic for that LSP. For example,
   it is not desirable to manually visit each LSR along the data
   plane path used to transport an LSP; instead,this function
   SHOULD be automated and able to be performed at some operator
   specified frequency from the origination point of that LSP.
   This implies solutions that are interoperable as to allow for
   such automatic operation. Furthermore, the automation of path
   liveliness is desired in cases where large numbers of LSPs might
   be tested. For example, automated ingress LSR to egress LSR testing
   functionality is desired for some LSPs. The goal is to detect LSP
   path defects before customers do, and this requires detection and
   correction of LSP defects in a manner that is both predictable and
   sufficiently within the constraints of the service level agreement
   under which the service is being offered. Simply put, the sum of
   the time it takes an OAM tool to detect a defect and
   the time needed for an operational support system to react to
   this defect by possibly correcting it or notifying the customer,
   must fall within the bounds of the service level agreement in
   question.


The discussion of ICMP-based ping appears to assume that
ICMP-based ping is an MPLS control plane function, even at
LSRs that only forward an ICMP packet (i.e., not the destination
of the ICMP packet, and not the node at which the TTL hits zero).
If that assumption is correct, it needs to be stated, but it
does not appear to be consistent with RFC 3032's discussion
of ICMP and MPLS, which specifically states that ICMP packets
can be label switched.  If ICMP-based ping goes through the
data plane as long as the TTL has not expired (which is what
I would expect), then this paragraph needs to be reworked.

        ICMP-based ping packets are carried within MPLS LSPs
and so are label-switched, but that is not guaranteed. Thus
inconsistencies can result (and be unpredictable).  Here is the
revised text:

   Although ICMP-based ping [RFC792] can be sent through an LSP as
an IP payload, the use of this tool to verify the defect free operation
   of an LSP has the potential for returning erroneous results (both
   positive and negative) for a number of reasons. First, since
   the ICMP traffic is based on legally addressable IP addressing,
   it is possible for ICMP messages that are originally transmitted
   inside of an LSP to "fall out of the LSP" at some point along
   the path. In these cases, since ICMP packets are routable
   a falsely positive response may be returned.  In other cases
   where the data plane of a specific LSP needs to be tested, it
   is difficult to guarantee that traffic based on an ICMP ping
   header is parsed and hashed to the same equal-cost multi-paths
   as the data traffic.

   Any detection mechanisms that depend on receiving status via a
   return path SHOULD provide multiple return options with the
   expectation that one of them will not be impacted by the original
   defect.  An example of a case where a false negative might occur
   would be a mechanism that requires a functional MPLS return path.
   Since MPLS LSPs are unidirectional, it is possible that although
   the forward LSP which is the LSP under test, might be functioning,
   the response from the destination LSR might be lost, thus giving
   the source LSR the false impression that the forward LSP is
   defective. However, if an alternate return path could be
   specified -- say IP for example -- then the source could
   specify this as the return path to the destination, and in
   this case, would receive a response indicating to it that
   the return LSP is defective.


Section 4.4 Service Level Agreement Measurement

    ... the qualitative
   aspects of LSPs such as jitter, delay, latency and loss

I believe "quantitative" should be substituted for "qualitative".

        Done.

Section 4.5 Frequency of OAM Execution

   ... probe-based detection mechanisms
   that incur significant mismatches in the probe rate

That doesn't parse for me - what is mismatched to what?  If
it's the rates of probing by multiple probe-based mechanisms,
the text quoted above should read:

        ... probe frequency or rate differences among multiple
        probe-based detection mechanisms

        How about:

   This includes the frequency of the execution of any OAM
   functions. The capability to synchronize OAM operations is required
   as to to permit consistent measurement of service level agreements.
   To elaborate, there are defect conditions such as misbranching or
   misdirection of traffic for which probe-based detection mechanisms
   that incur significant mismatches in their detection frequency MAY
   result in flapping. This can be addressed either by synchronizing
   the rate or having the probes self-identify their probe rate.
   For example, when the probing mechanisms are bootstrapping,
   they might negotiate and ultimately agree on a probing rate,
   therefore providing a consistent probing frequency and avoiding
   the aforementioned problems.


At the end of the section, I understand how synchronizing
probe rates helps address the problem of inconsistent views of
network problem state, but explanation is needed for how
"having the probes self-identify their probe rate" helps.

        Gotcha. See last sentence above.

Section 4.11 Per-LSP Accounting Requirements - ASBR acronym
used without expansion or definition.

        Added ASBR to acronyms section.

Section 4.11.1 Requirements - The use of the word "key" in
(4) invites confusion with security usage of that word.
Please pick another term such as "tag" or "identifier",
unless there is a specific need to use "key".

      (4) All LSRs that contain LSPs that are being measuremented
          need to have a common identifier to distinguish each LSP.
          The identifier MUST be unique to each LSP, and its mapping to
          LSP SHOULD be provided from whether manual or automatic
          configuration.

Section 4.11.2 Scalability - This is not about "scalability"
per se, but rather minimum accounting requirements motivated
by scaling considerations.  It should be retitled to "Location
of Accounting" or something like that.

Section 5 Security Considerations

The term "tools" in the first paragraph should be changed
to "network mechanisms", which is I believe this paragraph
is primarily about (e.g., authorization restrictions on use
of LSP Ping); tools is susceptible to being misread as being
primarily about the software applications that inspect the
network as opposed to the network mechanisms they use.


        Done. Here is the new text:

5. Security Considerations

   Provisions to any of the network mechanisms designed to satisfy
   the requirements described herin are required to prevent their
   unauthorized use. Likewise, these network mechanisms MUST
   provide a means by which an operator can prevent denial of
   service attacks if those network mechanisms are used in such
   an attack.

   LSP mis-merging has security implications beyond that of simply
   being a network defect. LSP mis-merging can happen due to a number
   of potential sources of failure, some of which (due to MPLS label
   stacking) are new to  MPLS.

   The performance of diagnostic functions and path characterization
   involve extracting a significant amount of information about
   network construction which the network operator MAY consider
   private.


Sections 6 and 11 on IANA Considerations are duplicative
(but consistent).  Remove one of them.

        Done; removed last one.

        I am attaching the revised version w/o formatting.
I will send this version to the I-D editor with formatting
as soon as I hear back from you that these changes are okay
(hopefully tomorrow -- Monday).

        --Tom




Network Working Group                         Thomas D. Nadeau
Internet Draft                                Monique Morrow
Expires: June 2006                            George Swallow
                                              Cisco Systems, Inc.

                                              David Allan
                                              Nortel Networks

                                              Satoru Matsushima
                                              Japan Telecom


                                              December 2005


           OAM Requirements for MPLS Networks
        draft-ietf-mpls-oam-requirements-07.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
   any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
   aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
   becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
   BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

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   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   As transport of diverse traffic types such as voice, frame
   relay, and ATM over MPLS become more common, the ability to detect,
   handle and diagnose control and data plane defects becomes
   critical.

   Detection and specification of how to handle those defects is not
   only important because such defects may not only affect the

   fundamental operation of an Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)
network, but also because they MAY impact service level specification
   commitments for customers of that network.

   This document describes requirements for user and data
   plane operations and management for MPLS.
   These requirements have been gathered
   from network operators who have extensive experience deploying
   MPLS networks, similarly some of these
   requirements have appeared in other documents. This draft specifies
   Operations and Management requirements for Multi-Protocol Label
   Switching, as well as for applications of Multi-Protocol Label
   Switching such as pseudowire voice and virtual private network
   services. Those interested in specific issues relating to
   instrumenting    MPLS for Operations
   and Management purposes are directed to the Multi-Protocol Label
   Switching Architecture specification.


Table of Contents
     Abstract.....................................................1
1.  Introduction.................................................2
2.  Document Conventions.........................................2
2.1 Terminology..................................................2
2.2 Acronyms.....................................................2
3.  Motivations..................................................2
4.  Requirements.................................................2
5.  Security Considerations.....................................26
6.  IANA considerations.........................................27
7.  References..................................................27
7.1 Normative references........................................27
7.2 Informative references......................................29
8.  Author's Addresses..........................................29
9.  Intellectual Property Notice................................30
10. Full Copyright Statement....................................29


1. Introduction

   This document describes requirements for user and data
   plane operations and management (OAM) for Multi-Protocol
   Label Switching (MPLS). These requirements have been gathered
   from network operators who have extensive experience deploying
   MPLS networks. This draft specifies OAM requirements
   for MPLS, as well as for applications of MPLS.

   No specific mechanisms are proposed to address these
   requirements at this time.  The goal of this draft is to
   identify a commonly applicable set of requirements for MPLS
   OAM at this time. Specifically, a set of requirements that apply
   to the most common set of MPLS networks deployed by service
   provider organizations today. These requirements can then be used
   as a base for network management tool development and to guide
   the evolution of currently specified tools, as well as the
   specification of OAM functions that are intrinsic to protocols
   used in MPLS networks.

   Comments should be made directly to the MPLS mailing list
   at [EMAIL PROTECTED]


2. Document Conventions

2.1 Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

   Defect:   Any error condition that prevents an Label Switched
             Path functioning correctly. For example, loss of an
             IGP path will most likely also result in an Label
             Switched Path not being able to deliver traffic to its
             destination. Another example is the breakage of
             a TE tunnel.  These MAY be due to physical
             circuit failures or failure of switching nodes
             to operate as expected.

             Multi-vendor/multi-provider network operation typically
             requires agreed upon definitions of defects (when it is
             broken and when it is not) such that both recovery
             procedures and service level specification impacts can
             be specified.

   Probe-based-detection: Active measurement using a tool such as
          Label Switched Path Ping.

   Collecting traffic: Passive measurement of network traffic.

   Head-end Label Switching Router (LSR): The beginning of a label
          switched path. A head-end LSR is also referred to as
          an Ingress Label Switching Router.

   Probe-based-detection: Active measurement using a tool such as
          Label Switched Path Ping.

   Collecting traffic: Passive measurement of network traffic.


   propagation latency: delay added by the propagation of the packet
                        through the link (fixed value that depends on
                        the distance of the link and the propagation
                        speed).

   transmission latency: delay added by the transmission of the packey
                         over the link i.e. the time it takes put the
                         packet over the media (value that depends of
                         the link throughput and packet length).

   processing latency: delay added by all the operations related to the
                       switching of labeled packet (value is node
                       implementation specific and may are considered
                       as fixed and constant for a given equipment).

   queuing/buffering latency: delay caused by packet queuing (value is
                              variable since depending on the packet
                              arrival rate in addition to the
                              dependance on the packet length and the
                              link throughput).

   node latency: delay added by the network element resulting from of
                 the sum of the transmission, processing and queuing/
                 buffering latency

   one-hop delay: fixed delay experienced by a packet to reach the next
                  hop reesulting from the of the propagation latency,
                  the transmission latency and the processing latency.

   minimum path latency: sum of the one-hop delays experienced by the
                         packet when travelling from the ingress to the
                         egress LSR.

   variable path latency (jitter): sum of the delays caused by the
                                   queuing latency experienced by the
                                   packet at each node over the path.


2.2 Acronyms

ASBR:   Autonomous System Border Router

   CE:   Customer Edge

   SP:   Service Provider

   ECMP: Equal Cost Multipath

   LSP:  Label Switched Path

   LSP Ping: Label Switched Path Ping

   LSR:  Label Switching Router

   OAM:  Operations and Management

   RSVP: Resource reSerVation Protocol

   LDP:  Label Distribution Protocol

   DoS:  Denial of service

3.  Motivations

   This document was created in order to provide requirements
   which could be used to create consistent and useful OAM
   functionality that meets operational requirements of those
   service providers who have or are deploying MPLS.

4. Requirements

   The following sections enumerate the OAM requirements
   gathered from service providers who have deployed MPLS
   and services based on MPLS networks. Each requirement is
   specified in detail to clarify its applicability.
   Although the requirements specified herein are defined by
   the IETF, they have been harmonized with requirements
   gathered by other standards bodies such as the ITU [Y1710].


   4.1 Detection of Label Switched Path Defects

   The ability to detect defects in a broken Label Switched Path
   (LSP) SHOULD not require manual hop-by-hop troubleshooting of
   each LSR used to switch traffic for that LSP. For example,
   it is not desirable to manually visit each LSR along the data
   plane path used to transport an LSP; instead,this function
   SHOULD be automated and able to be performed at some operator
   specified frequency from the origination point of that LSP.
   This implies solutions that are interoperable as to allow for
   such automatic operation. Furthermore, the automation of path
   liveliness is desired in cases where large numbers of LSPs might
   be tested. For example, automated ingress LSR to egress LSR testing
   functionality is desired for some LSPs. The goal is to detect LSP
   path defects before customers do, and this requires detection and
   correction of LSP defects in a manner that is both predictable and
   sufficiently within the constraints of the service level agreement
   under which the service is being offered. Simply put, the sum of
   the time it takes an OAM tool to detect a defect and
   the time needed for an operational support system to react to
   this defect by possibly correcting it or notifying the customer,
   must fall within the bounds of the service level agreement in
   question.

   Synchronization of detection time bounds by tools used to detect
   broken LSPs is required. Failure to specifying defect detection
   time bounds may result in an ambiguity in test results. If the
   time to detect is known, then automated responses can be specified
   both with respect to and with regard to resiliency and service
   level specification reporting. Further, if synchronization of
   detection time bounds is possible, an operational framework can be
   established that can guide the design and specification of MPLS
   applications.

   Although ICMP-based ping [RFC792] can be sent through an LSP as
an IP payload, the use of this tool to verify the defect free operation
   of an LSP has the potential for returning erroneous results (both
   positive and negative) for a number of reasons. First, since
   the ICMP traffic is based on legally addressable IP addressing,
   it is possible for ICMP messages that are originally transmitted
   inside of an LSP to "fall out of the LSP" at some point along
   the path. In these cases, since ICMP packets are routable
   a falsely positive response may be returned.  In other cases
   where the data plane of a specific LSP needs to be tested, it
   is difficult to guarantee that traffic based on an ICMP ping
   header is parsed and hashed to the same equal-cost multi-paths
   as the data traffic.

   Any detection mechanisms that depend on receiving status via a
   return path SHOULD provide multiple return options with the
   expectation that one of them will not be impacted by the original
   defect.  An example of a case where a false negative might occur
   would be a mechanism that requires a functional MPLS return path.
   Since MPLS LSPs are unidirectional, it is possible that although
   the forward LSP which is the LSP under test, might be functioning,
   the response from the destination LSR might be lost, thus giving
   the source LSR the false impression that the forward LSP is
   defective. However, if an alternate return path could be
   specified -- say IP for example -- then the source could
   specify this as the return path to the destination, and in
   this case, would receive a response indicating to it that
   the return LSP is defective.

   The OAM packet MUST follow exactly the customer data path in order
   to reflect path liveliness used by customer data. Particular cases
   of interest are forwarding mechanisms such as equal cost multipath
   (ECMP) scenarios within the operator's network whereby flows are
   load-shared across parallel (i.e., equal IGP cost) paths. Where
   the customer traffic MAY be spread over multiple paths, what is
   required is to be able to detect failures on any of the path
   permutations.  Where the spreading mechanism is payload specific,
   payloads need to have forwarding that is common with the traffic
   under test. Satisfying these requirements introduces complexity
   into ensuring that ECMP connectivity permutations are exercised,
   and that defect detection occurs in a reasonable amount of time.

  4.2 Diagnosis of a Broken Label Switched Path

   The ability to diagnose a broken LSP and to isolate the failed
   component (i.e., link or node) in the path is required. For
   example, note that specifying recovery actions for misbranching
   defects in an LDP network is a particularly difficult case.
   Diagnosis of defects and isolation of the failed component is
   best accomplished via a path trace function which can return the
   the entire list of LSRs and links used by a certain LSP (or at
   least the set of LSRs/links up to the location of the defect) is
   required. The tracing capability SHOULD include the ability to
   trace recursive paths, such as when nested LSPs are used. This
   path trace function MUST also be capable of diagnosing LSP
   mis-merging by permitting comparison of expected vs. actual
   forwarding behavior at any LSR in the path. The path trace
   capability SHOULD be capable of being executed from both the
   head-end Label Switching Router (LSR) and MAY permit downstream
   path components to be traced from an intermediate mid-point LSR.
   Additionally, the path trace function MUST have the ability to
   support equal cost multipath scenarios described above in
   section 4.1.

  4.3 Path characterization

   The path characterization function is the ability to reveal details
   of LSR forwarding operations. These details can then be compared
   later during subsequent testing relevant to OAM functionality.
   This would include but is not limited to:

     - consistent use of pipe or uniform time to live (TTL) models by
       an LSR [RFC3443].
     - sufficient details that allow the test origin to
       excersize all path permutations related to load spreading
       (e.g. ECMP).
     - stack operations performed by the LSR, such as pushes, pops,
       and TTL propagation at penultimate hop LSRs.


   4.4 Service Level Agreement Measurement

   Mechanisms are required to measure the diverse aspects of Service
   Level Agreements which include:
     - defect free forwarding. The service is considered to be
       available and the other aspects of performance measurement
       listed below have meaning, or the service is unavailable and
       other aspects of performance measurement do not.
     - latency - amount of time required for traffic to transit
       the network
     - packet loss
     - jitter - measurement of latency variation

   Such measurements can be made independently of the user traffic
   or via a hybrid of user traffic measurement and OAM probing.

   At least one mechanism is required to measure the number
   of OAM packets. In addition, the ability to measure the
   quantitative aspects of LSPs such as jitter, delay, latency and
   loss MUST be available in order to determine whether or not the
   traffic for a specific LSP are traveling within the
   operator-specified tollerances.

   Any method considered SHOULD be capable of measuring the latency
   of an LSP with minimal impact on network resources.  See section
   2.1 for definitions of the various quantitative aspects of LSPs.


   4.5 Frequency of OAM Execution

   The operator MUST have the flexibility to configure OAM
   parameters insofaras to meet their specific operational
   requirements.

   This includes the frequency of the execution of any OAM
   functions. The capability to synchronize OAM operations is required
   as to to permit consistent measurement of service level agreements.
   To elaborate, there are defect conditions such as misbranching or
   misdirection of traffic for which probe-based detection mechanisms
   that incur significant mismatches in their detection frequency MAY
   result in flapping. This can be addressed either by synchronizing
   the rate or having the probes self-identify their probe rate.
   For example, when the probing mechanisms are bootstrapping,
   they might negotiate and ultimately agree on a probing rate,
   therefore providing a consistent probing frequency and avoiding
   the aforementioned problems.

   One observation would be that wide-spread deployment of MPLS, common
   implementation of monitoring tools and the need for
   inter-carrier synchronization of defect and service level
   specification handling will drive specification of OAM parameters
   to commonly agreed on values and such values will have to be
   harmonized with the surrounding technologies (e.g. SONET/SDH,
   ATM etc.) in order to be useful. This will become particularly
   important as networks scale and misconfiguration can result in
   churn, alarm flapping etc.


  4.6 Alarm Suppression, Aggregation and Layer Coordination

   Network elements MUST provide alarm suppression functionality that
   prevents the generation of superfluous generation of alarms by
   simply discarding them (or not generating them in the first place),
   or by aggregating them together, and thereby greatly reducing the
   number of notifications emitted.  When viewed in conjuction with
   requirement 4.7 below, this typically requires fault notification
   to the LSP egress that
   MAY have specific time constraints if the application using the LSP
   independently implements path continuity testing (for example ATM
   I.610 Continuity check (CC)[I610]).  These constraints apply to
   LSPs that are monitored. The nature of MPLS applications allows
   for the possibility to have multiple MPLS applications attempt to
   respond to defects simultaneously. For example, layer-3 MPLS VPNs
   that utilize Traffic Engineered tunnels, where a failure occurs on
   the LSP carrying the Traffic Engineered tunnel. This failure would
   affect he VPN traffic that uses the tunnel's LSP. Mechanisms are
   required to coordinate network response to defects.


   4.7 Support for OAM Interworking for Fault Notification

   An LSR supporting the interworking of one or more networking
   technologies over MPLS MUST be able to translate an MPLS defect
   into the native technology's error condition. For example, errors
   occurring over a MPLS transport LSP that supports an emulated
   ATM VC MUST translate errors into native ATM OAM Alarm Indication
   Signal (AIS) cells at the termination points of the LSP. The
   mechanism SHOULD consider possible bounded detection time
   parameters, e.g., a "hold off" function before reacting as to
   synchronize with the OAM functions.
   One goal would be alarm suppression by the upper layer using
   the LSP. As observed in section 4.5, this requires that MPLS
   perform detection in a bounded timeframe in order to initiate
   alarm suppression prior to the upper layer independently
   detecting the defect.

   4.8 Error Detection and Recovery.

   Recovery from a fault by a network element can be facilitated by
   MPLS OAM procedures. These procesures will detect a broader range
   of defects than that of simple link and node failures.
   Since MPLS LSPs may span multiple routing areas and service provider
   domains, fault recovery and error detection should be possible
   in these configuration as well as in the more simplifed
   single-area/domain configurations.

   Recovery from faults SHOULD be automatic. It is a requirement that
   faults SHOULD be detected (and possibly corrected) by the network
   operator prior to customers of the service in question detecting
   them.


   4.9 Standard Management Interfaces

   The wide-spread deployment of MPLS requires common information
   modeling of management and control of OAM functionality. This is
   reflected in the the integration of standard MPLS-related MIBs
   (e.g. [RFC3813][RFC3812][RFC3814]) for fault, statistics and
   configuration management. These standard interfaces provide
   operators with common programmatic interface access to
   operations and management functions and their status.

   4.10  Detection of Denial of Service Attacks

   The ability to detect denial of service (DoS) attacks against the
   data or control planes MUST be part of any security management
   related to MPLS OAM tools or techniques.

   4.11 Per-LSP Accounting Requirements

   In an MPLS network, service providers (SPs) can measure traffic
   from an LSR to the egress of the network using some MPLS related
   MIBs, for example. This means that it is a reasonable to know how
   much traffic is traveling from where to where (i.e., a traffic
   matrix) by analyzing the flow of traffic. Therefore, traffic
   accounting in an MPLS network can be summarized as the following
   three items.

     (1) Collecting information to design network

         Providers and their customers MAY need to verify high-level
         service level specifications, either to continuously
         optimize their networks, or to offer guaranteed bandwidth
         services. Therefore, traffic accounting to monitor MPLS
         applications is required.

     (2) Providing a Service Level Specification

         For the purpose of optimized network design, a service
         provider may offer the traffic informationr. Optimizing
         network design needs this information.

     (3) Inter-AS environment

         Service providers that offer inter-AS services require
         accounting of those services.

     These three motivations need to satisfy the following.

        - In (1) and (2), collection of information on a per-LSP
          basis is a minimum level of granularity of collecting
          accounting information at both of ingress and egress
          of an LSP.

        - In (3), SP's ASBR carry out interconnection functions as an
          intermediate LSR. Therefore, identifying a pair of ingress
          and egress LSRs using each LSP is needed to determine the
          cost of the service that a customer is using.

    4.11.1 Requirements

     Accounting on a per-LSP basis encompasses the following set of
     functions:

      (1) At an ingress LSR accounting of traffic through LSPs
          beginning at each egress in question.

      (2) At an intermediate LSR, accounting of traffic through
          LSPs for each pair of ingress to egress.

      (3) At egress LSR, accounting of traffic through LSPs
          for each ingress.

      (4) All LSRs that contain LSPs that are being measuremented
          need to have a common identifier to distinguish each LSP.
          The identifier MUST be unique to each LSP, and its mapping to
          LSP SHOULD be provided from whether manual or automatic
          configuration.

       In the case of non-merged LSPs, this can be achieved by
       simply reading traffic counters for the label stack associated
       with the LSP at any LSR along its path. However, in order to
       measure merged LSPs, an LSR MUST have a means to distinguish
       the source of each flow so as to disambiguate the statistics.

     4.11.2 Scalability

     It is not realistic to perform the just described operations by
     LSRs in a network on all LSPs that exist in a network.
     At a minimum, per-LSP based accounting SHOULD be performed on the
     edges of the network -- at the edges of both LSPs and the MPLS
     domain.

5. Security Considerations

   Provisions to any of the network mechanisms designed to satisfy
   the requirements described herin are required to prevent their
   unauthorized use. Likewise, these network mechanisms MUST
   provide a means by which an operator can prevent denial of
   service attacks if those network mechanisms are used in such
   an attack.

   LSP mis-merging has security implications beyond that of simply
   being a network defect. LSP mis-merging can happen due to a number
   of potential sources of failure, some of which (due to MPLS label
   stacking) are new to  MPLS.

   The performance of diagnostic functions and path characterization
   involve extracting a significant amount of information about
   network construction which the network operator MAY consider
   private.

6. IANA Considerations
   This document creates no new requirements on IANA namespaces
   [RFC2434].

7. References

7.1 Informative References

   [RFC3812]     Srinivasan, C., Viswanathan, A. and T.
                 Nadeau, "MPLS Traffic Engineering Management
                 Information Base Using SMIv2", RFC3812, June 2004.

   [RFC3813]     Srinivasan, C., Viswanathan, A. and T.
                 Nadeau, "MPLS Label Switch Router Management
                 Information Base Using SMIv2", RFC3813, June 2004.

   [RFC3814]     Nadeau, T., Srinivasan, C., and A.
                 Viswanathan, "Multiprotocol Label Switching
                 (MPLS) FEC-To-NHLFE (FTN) Management
                 Information Base", RFC3814, June 2004.

   [Y1710]       ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710, "Requirements for
                  OAM Functionality In MPLS Networks"


   [I610]      ITU-T Recommendation I.610, "B-ISDN operations and
               maintenance principles and functions", February 1999


   [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
             an IANA Considerations section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC
             2434, October 1998.

   [RFC792]  Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", RFC792,
             September 1981.

   [RFC3443] Agarwal, P, Akyol, B., "Time To Live (TTL) Processing in
             Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Networks.", RFC3443,
             January 2003.
        

8. Authors' Addresses

   Thomas D. Nadeau
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   300 Beaver Brook Road
   Boxboro, MA 01719
   Phone: +1-978-936-1470
   Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Monique Jeanne Morrow
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Glatt-Com, 2nd Floor
   CH-8301
   Switzerland
   Voice:  (0)1 878-9412
   Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

   George Swallow
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   300 Beaver Brook Road
   Boxboro, MA 01719
   Voice: +1-978-936-1398
   Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

   David Allan
   Nortel Networks
   3500 Carling Ave.
   Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA
   Voice: 1-613-763-6362
   Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

   Satoru Matsushima
   Japan Telecom
   4-7-1, Hatchobori, Chuo-ku
   Tokyo, 104-8508 Japan
   Phone: +81-3-5540-8214
   Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

9. Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]

10.  Full Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is
    subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP
    78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their
    rights.

    This document and the information contained herein are provided
    on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
    REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND
    THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
    EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
    THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR
    ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
    PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

11. Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

   The authors wish to acknowledge and thank the following
   individuals for their valuable comments to this document:
   Adrian Smith, British Telecom; Chou Lan Pok, SBC; Mr.
   Ikejiri, NTT Communications and Mr.Kumaki of KDDI.
   Hari Rakotoranto, Miya Khono, Cisco Systems; Luyuan Fang, AT&T;
   Danny McPherson, TCB; Dr.Ken Nagami, Ikuo Nakagawa, Intec Netcore,
   and David Meyer.


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