On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 5:14 AM, Jakub Jelinek <ja...@redhat.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 02:08:48PM +0100, Richard Biener wrote: >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Eric Botcazou <ebotca...@adacore.com> >> wrote: >> >> It's really just a couple of new primitives to emit a jump as a call and >> >> one to slam in a new return address. Given those I think you can do the >> >> entire implementation as RTL at expansion time and you've got a damn >> >> good shot at protecting most architectures from these kinds of attacks. >> > >> > I think that you're a bit optimistic here and that implementing a generic >> > and >> > robust framework at the RTL level might require some time. Given the time >> > and >> > (back-)portability constraints, it might be wiser to rush into >> > architecture- >> > specific countermeasures than to rush into an half-backed RTL framework. >> >> Let me also say that while it might be nice to commonize code introducing >> these >> mitigations as late as possible to not disrupt optimization is important. >> So I >> don't see a very strong motivation in trying very hard to make this more >> middle-endish, apart from maybe sharing helper functions where possible. > > That and perhaps a common option to handle the cases that are common to > multiple backends (i.e. move some options from -m* namespace to -f*). > I'd say the decision about the options and ABI of what we emit is more > important than where we actually emit it, we can easily change where we do > that over time, but not the options nor the ABI. >
My x86 mitigations are specific to x86 processors. I don't know if these options are relevant to other processors. However, it is a good to have a common option to enable mitigations, which can be built on top of processor specific options. For example, -fmitigate-spectre may simply imply -mindirect-branch=thunk -mindirect-branch-register For kernel, they may want to use -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register instead. -- H.J.