This code is horrible. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/ssl/t1_lib.c#L2893
/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI * absence on initial connect only. */ Um, you're kidding me right? What the actual fuck. On Tue, 2014-04-08 at 03:10 +0300, Kirils Solovjovs wrote: > We are doomed. > > Description: http://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html > Article dedicated to the bug: http://heartbleed.com/ > Tool to check if TLS heartbeat extension is supported: > http://possible.lv/tools/hb/ > > A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension > can be used to reveal up to 64kB of memory to a connected client or server. > > 1.0.1[ abcdef] affected. > > > P.S. Happy Monday! > > _______________________________________________ > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list > http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure > Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
