I think we are using 'metaphor' in an inconsistent fashion.
My viewpoint begins with W. V. O. Quine:
*"Along the philosophical fringes of science, reasons may be found to question
basic conceptual structures and to search for ways to reshape them. Old idioms
are bound to fail, and only metaphor can begin to limn the new order"*
Then add McCormac's "lifecycle." First is the *epiphor, *e.g., an atom is like
a solar system, nucleus and orbiting electrons.
The familiar side of this relation suggests referents/aspects that can be
looked for on the unfamiliar side.
If these referents/aspects are confirmed the paraphor evolves to be a lexical
term.
If they are not confirmed, the metaphor becomes a dead metaphor and is
discarded.
There are some special cases: the Bohr model of an atom as solar system,
persists, not because referents/aspects are confirmed on both sides—quite the
opposit—but because it is a useful tool for teaching elementary chemistry.
In my CS Masters Thesis and first professional publication, I coined the term,
paraphor for a metaphor—specifically the brain-computer / computer-brain
metaphor—where the referents are consistently contradicted but the metaphor
persists because it fits a prevailing paradigm of thought about the subject
area.
I am sympathetic to the assertion by Nick, et. al., "that it is all metaphor."
but on very different grounds. In my case the "all is illusion" and antipathy
to the verb to be.
davew
On Wed, Jul 16, 2025, at 10:53 AM, glen wrote:
> I had intended to only address Dave's assertion "trapped within a
> narrowly defined model". But I'll try to tackle 2 objections at the
> same time. Again, my target is this "everything's a metaphor" bullshit.
>
> "Familiar" is a problematic term, here. Both Dave and Steve invoke the
> "definite" (ala Feferman's "what is definite"). When we use formal,
> schematic systems to translate a method from one domain to another,
> it's fine to call that "metaphor" at a cocktail party. But it's just
> not. Unbound/a-semantic terms are not metaphorical terms.
>
> Now, Steve's right to separate (A) from (B) because "explaining" is
> different from translation, at least in the naive science/knowledge
> sense. (In the less bound/grounded statistics sense, they're closer to
> the same concept. But it seems Steve means the science/knowledge
> sense.) And when we explain things this way (by allowing some flex and
> slop in some of the terms of the model so someone from another domain
> can do the mapping themselves), we're relying on the audience to have a
> bushy *context* so they can/could bind all the terms as concretely
> (definitely) as we've done in the source domain. If the 2 contexts
> (person modeling in the source domain & person modeling in the target
> domain) aren't equivalently rich, then "explanation" fails.
>
> And this is where Dave's wrong about multiscale modeling. The context
> at the large scale can be wildly different from the context at the
> meso- or micro-scales, similar between meso- and micro-scales. It
> hinges on whatever is meant by "narrow", of course. But multi-modal
> modeling not only exists, but is fairly common. There are even toolkits
> for doing it without giving it too much thought. All that's needed is
> to define (or even loosely describe) couplings between the modes so
> that they can sync up in time and space. Within the components,
> anything goes.
>
> On 7/15/25 2:27 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
>> Literary metaphor is the tool which literary practicioners use to
>> formalize (less rigorously by design?) their own models of their observation
>> of the world. Somewhere in between or elsewhere (to invoke a spatial
>> metaphor?) lies the conceptual metaphors I claim we all use all the time to
>> A) apply our intuitive experience/understanding in one familiar domain to
>> another less familiar one; B) to explain things we (think we) understand in
>> a domain we are familiar with to someone else who is more familiar with
>> another domain. Yes there is lossy compression and distortion involved in
>> thee processes when used in good faith. When used in bad faith (e.g.
>> political rhetoric), this becomes a feature (of the persuasion) not a bug
>> (of the understanding/communication).
>>
>> </mansplainery>
>>
>>
>> On 7/15/2025 2:52 PM, Prof David West wrote:
>>> I like your framework and it has some direct relevance to the other part of
>>> this thread about McGilchrist.
>>>
>>> I would add multi-disciplinary ("broadly skilled") modelers to multiscale
>>> modelers and actually think them more important. Multiscale modelers might
>>> be able to avoid composition fallacies but will still be trapped within a
>>> narrowly defined model.
>>>
>>> I would also go out on a limb and claim that metaphor and metaphoric
>>> reasoning is key to being able to select a model that best fits.
>>>
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