Excellent! I appreciate your clarification as to why it might be
useful to explore. I will do so. I'm still a bit confused as to why
you mentioned it in the context of me claiming that "the bot" (e.g.
ChatGPT) has a body.
I think I was ignoring that bit of context entirely... however "all
computation is embodied" feels like a tautology to me? Even though many
with a bio-centric view might not think of computational substrate as
"body"? I think the inlined Rączaszek‑Leonardi quote I included might
speak to the larger? question about (dis/pan)embodiment?
Or the context of claiming some forms of panpsychism are monist. Maybe
I'll figure out why Deacon's relevant to one or both of those comments
as I read through Rączaszek‑Leonardi's essay.
I think Deacon's molecule->sign argument might be monist as well as
panpsychist. I find Deacon's recursive bootstrap-scaffold from
homeodynamic to morphodynamic to teleodynamic to *gesture at* how
energy-stuff yields matter-stuff yields body-stuff yields mind-stuff
yields mind++-stuff (or more generally
life-like/intelligence-like/consiousness-like/ends-in-mind/teleo)-stuff.
I can't say I'm smart enough, or have applied myself enough (or both) to
his constructions and reflections to say with confidence that he's being
successful in this project... the homeo/morpho/teleo prefixes suggest
3 qualitative groupings of "differences that make a difference" in a
chain of supervenient/emergent properties.
-. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
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