I do not know and have not read Feferman, so this may be totally off base, but
...
glen stated:
*Worded one way: Schema are the stable patterns that emerge from the
particulars. And the variation of the particulars is circumscribed (bounded,
defined) by the schema.
*
This is a description of "culture." Restated—hopefully without distorting the
meaning:
*Culture is the stable patterns of behavior that emerge from individual human
actions which vary (are idiosyncratic) within bounds defined by the culture.*
The second glen statement:
*Worded another way: Our perspective on the world emerges from the world. And
our perspective on the world shapes how and what we see of the world.*
alludes to the cognitive feedback loop (at least part of it) that I developed
in my doctoral dissertation on cognitive anthrpology.
davew
On Mon, Jan 16, 2023, at 3:32 AM, glen wrote:
> Well, not "languageless", but "language-independent". Now that you've
> forced me to think harder, that phrase "language-independent" isn't
> quite right. It's more like "meta-language" ... a family of languages
> such that the family might be "language-like" ... a language of
> languages ... a higher order language, maybe.
>
> Feferman introduced me to the concept of "schematic axiomatic systems",
> which seems (correct me if I'm wrong) to talk about formal systems
> where one reasons over sentences with substitutable elements. I.e. the
> *particulars* of any given situation may vary, but the "scheme" into
> which those particulars fit is stable/invariant. [⛧]
>
> EricS seemed to be proposing that not only do the particulars vary
> within the schema, but the schema also vary. The schema are ways to
> "parse" the world, the Play-Doh extruder(s) we use to form the Play-Doh
> into something.
>
> Your "random yet not random" rendering of Peirce sounds to me similar
> to the duality between the particulars and the schema they populate.
>
> Worded one way: Schema are the stable patterns that emerge from the
> particulars. And the variation of the particulars is circumscribed
> (bounded, defined) by the schema.
>
> Worded another way: Our perspective on the world emerges from the
> world. And our perspective on the world shapes how and what we see of
> the world.
>
> And, finally, paraphrasing: The apparition of schema we experience is
> due to the fact that such schema are useful to organisms. Events in the
> world that don't fit the schema are beyond experience.
>
>
> [⛧] I'm doing my best to avoid talking about jargonal things like type
> theory, things that should have come very natural to Peirce, but would
> be difficult to express in natural language.
>
> On 1/15/23 19:49, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>> EricS and Glen,
>>
>> Sorry, again. Here is the short version. I apologize, again, for appending
>> that great wadge of gunk.
>>
>> I found the second Feferman even harder to understand than the first. Glen,
>> can you give me a little help on what you meant by a languageless language.
>>
>> Thanks, all
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 15, 2023 at 4:09 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> Aw crap! The shortish answer that I meant to send had all sorts of
>> junk appended! Sorry. Will resend soon. [blush]
>>
>> Sent from my Dumb Phone
>>
>> On Jan 12, 2023, at 8:54 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is following.
>>
>> Thank you so much for pitching in. As I have often said, I am
>> incapable of thinking alone, so your comments are wonderfully welcome. And
>> thank you also for confirming that what I wrote was readable. I am having
>> to work in gmail at the moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium.
>>
>> First, Eric: I am trying to talk math-talk in this passage, so poetry
>> is not an excuse if I fail to be understood by you.
>>
>> /*FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent
>> that there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my
>> words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between
>> states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation
>> of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in
>> statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate. We don’t have
>> any ontological problems understanding sample estimators and the quantities
>> estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things.
>> In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly play
>> different roles and stand for different concepts.*/
>> /*
>> */
>> I like very muchwhat you have written here and think it states, perhaps
>> more precisely than I managed, exactly what I was trying to say. I do want
>> to further stress the fact that if a measurement system is tracking a
>> variate that is going to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on
>> average approximate that value with greater precision the more measures are
>> taken. Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence constitute
>> evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that there is convergence
>> is evidence that there is a truth to be located. Thus I agree with you
>> that the idea behind Peirce's notion of truth is the central limit theorem.
>>
>> Where we might disagree is whether there is any meaning to truth beyond
>> that central limit. This is where I found you use of "ontology" so helpful.
>> When talking about statistics, we are always talking about mathematical
>> structures in experience and nothing beyond that. We are assuredly talking
>> about only one kind of thing. However, I see you wondering, are there
>> things to talk about beyond the statistical structures of experience? I
>> hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me wanting to say "no".
>>
>> God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my hankering would seem
>> to be arrogant to the point of absurdity. Given all the forms of discourse
>> in which the words "truth" and "real" are used, all the myriad language
>> games in which these words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or
>> Peirce) claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the
>> truth of any proposition or the reality of any abject can be demonstrated?
>> I think I have to claim (and I think Peirce claims it) that whatever people
>> may say about how they evaluate truth or reality claims, their evaluation
>> always boils down to an appeal to the long run of experience.
>>
>> Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is perhaps related to the
>> difference of opinion between James and Peirce concerning the relation
>> between truth as a believed thing and truth as a thing beyond the belief of
>> any finite group of people. James was a physician, and presumably knew a
>> lot about the power of placebos. He also was a ditherer, who famously took
>> years to decide whom to marry and agonized about it piteously to his
>> siblings. James was fascinated by the power of belief to make things true
>> and the power of doubt to make them impossible. Who could jump a chasm who
>> did not believe that he could jump a chasm! For Peirce, this sort of
>> thinking was just empty psychologizing. Truth was indeed a kind of opinion,
>> but it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the operation of
>> scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably converge.
>>
>> EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to say about this,
>> including that it is total garbage.
>>
>> As for Fefferman, my brief attempt to learn enough about Fefferman to
>> appear intelligent led me to the website,
>> http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html
>> <http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html>, which might be the
>> weirdest website I have ever gone to. I don't THINK that a language-free
>> language is my unicorn, but Glen NEVER says something for nothing, so I am
>> withholding judgement until he boxes my ears again. I think my unicorn may
>> be that all truth is statistical and, therefore, provisional. Literally: a
>> seeing into the future.
>>
>> Thanks again for helping out, you guys!
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Consider, for a moment, the role of placebos in medicine.
>>
>> Consider the ritual of transubstantiation. At the moment that you sip
>> it, is the contents of the chalice Really "blood."
>>
>> /*Peirce writes, "Consider what effects, which may have practical
>> bearing, the object of your conception to have. Then our **conception of
>> those effects is our whole of our conception of the object.*/
>>
>> "The Whole"?! Really? Now somebody of Peircean Pursuasion would point
>> out that, if a parishionner were to burst a blood vessel, and a doctor with
>> a transfusion kit were present, NObody would conceive that the patient
>> should b transfused with communion wine. Since causing instant death upon
>> tranfusion is not one of the conceivable consequences of the chalice
>> containing blood (leave aside immunity issues ), and is a conceivable
>> consequence of transfusing communion wine, we are warranted to say that,
>> despite what the practice of communion implies, the stuff in the challice
>> is wine not blood.
>>
>> But it's entirely conceivable that some parissioners, at theinstant of
>> communion, do conceive of the wine as blood, and experience changes of
>> themselves and teh world around them as a consequence of receiving communion.
>>
>> Fork 1 here "The Whole"?! Really? Consider the phenomenon of a
>> _________________ effects.
>> /*
>> */
>> The juice here is what we think we are estimating. Are we estimating
>> the true state of affairs in some world we cannot more directly access or
>> are we estimating the final resting place of the statistic we are measuring.
>> My point, here, is that the latter is all we have. To the extent that
>> anything in experience is non-random (ie, some events are predictive of
>> other events), any mechanism that homes on these contingencies will be
>> selected if the consequences are of importance to reproduction of the
>> organism. we live in a mostly random world and to the extent that our
>> methods of inquiry are useful, further inquiry will probably narrow our
>> estimate of some property within finer and finer limits. This is a process
>> I would call inductive.
>>
>> Now I think, in your latter comments, you are getting at the fact that
>> this is only one kind of convergence,and is dependent on a prior convergence
>> concerning what identifies a substance as lithium. Before we can determine
>> the boiling point of lithium we have first to agree upon which substances
>> are lithium and which operations constitute "boiling". These are decisions
>> that are abductive in nature, and, to that extent are less straight-forward.
>> Lets say we are interested in determining the boiling point of Li and we
>> are sent looking for some li to biol. We come accross a lump of grey metal
>> witha dark finish in our lab drawer and we want ot know if this is lithium.
>> The logic here (light grey substance with dark finish =? lithiumisthe logic
>> ofabduction. That this first test is positive will lead you toperform yet
>> another abductive lest: is it noticeably light when youbalance it in
>> yourhadn, can you cut it withthe plasticknife you brought home with your
>> take-out
>> lunch , etc. These tests are similarly abductive (Li is light, theis
>> substance is light, this sjumbstance isli;Li is soft, this substance is
>> soft, this substanve is Li. When enough of these tests have come up positive
>> you will declare the substance to be Li an procede to measure its boiling
>> point. (A similar series of abductions willbe require to agree upon what
>> constitutes "boiling".
>>
>> *Lithium* (from Greek <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language>:
>> λίθος, romanized <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek>:
>> /lithos/, lit. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation> 'stone')
>> is a chemical element <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element> with
>> the symbol <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)> *Li* and
>> atomic number <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number> 3. It is a soft,
>> silvery-white alkali metal <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal>.
>> Under standard conditions
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure>, it is the
>> least dense metal and the least dense solid element. Like all alkali metals,
>> lithium is highly reactive
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)> and flammable, and
>> must be stored in vacuum, inert atmosphere, or inert liquid such as purified
>> kerosene or mineral oil. When cut, it exhibits a metallic luster
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)>, but moist air
>> corrodes <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion> it quickly to a dull
>> silvery gray, then black tarnish. It never occurs freely in nature, but only
>> in (usually ionic) compounds
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound>, such as pegmatitic
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite> minerals, which were once the main
>> source of lithium. Due to its solubility as an ion, it is present in ocean
>> water and is commonly obtained from brines
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine>. Lithium metal is isolated
>> electrolytically <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis> from a mixture
>> of lithium chloride <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride> and
>> potassium chloride <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride>.
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 8, 2023 at 3:21 AM glen <[email protected]
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> This smacks of Feferman's claim that "implicit in the acceptance of
>> given schemata is the acceptance of any meaningful substitution instances
>> that one may come to meet, but which those instances are is not determined
>> by restriction to a specific language fixed in advance." ... or in the
>> language of my youth, you reap what you sow.
>>
>> To Nick's credit (without any presumption that I know anything about
>> Peirce), he seems to be hunting the same unicorn Feferman's hunting,
>> something like a language-independent language. Or maybe something analogous
>> to a moment (cf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)>)?
>>
>> While we're on the subject, Martin Davis died recently:
>> https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/
>> <https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/> As terse as
>> he was with me when I complained about him leaving Tarski out of "Engines of
>> Logic", his loss will be felt, especially to us randos on the internet.
>>
>> On 1/7/23 15:20, David Eric Smith wrote:
>> > Nick, the text renders.
>> >
>> > You use words in ways that I cannot parse. Some of them seem
>> very poetic, suggesting that your intended meaning is different in its whole
>> cast from one I could try for.
>> >
>> > FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the
>> extent that there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically
>> using my words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation
>> between states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful
>> representation of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample
>> estimators in statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate.
>> >
>> > We don’t have any ontological problems understanding sample
>> estimators and the quantities estimated, as both have status in the ordinary
>> world of empirical things. In our ontology, they are peers in some sense,
>> but they clearly play different roles and stand for different concepts.
>> >
>> > When we come, however, to “states of knowledge” and “truth” as
>> “what will bear out in the long run”, in addition to the fact that we must
>> study the roles of these tokens in our thought and discourse, if we want to
>> get at the concepts expressive of their nature, we also have a hideously
>> more complicated structure to categorize, than mere sample estimators and
>> the corresponding “actual” values they are constructed to estimate. For
>> sample estimation, in some sense, we know that the representation for the
>> estimator and the estimated is the same, and that they are both numbers in
>> some number system. If we wish to discuss states of knowledge and truth,
>> everything is up for grabs: every convention for a word’s denotation and all
>> the rules for its use in a language that confer parts of its meaning. All
>> the conventions for procedures of observation and guided experience. All
>> the formal or informal modes of discourse in which we organize our
>> intersubjective experience
>> pools and
>> > build something from them. All of that is allowed to
>> “fluctuate”, as we would say in statistics of sample estimators. The
>> representation scheme itself, and our capacities to perceive through it, are
>> all things we seek to bring into some convergence toward a “faithful
>> representation” of “what is the case”.
>> >
>> > Speaking or thinking in an orderly way about that seems to have
>> many technical as well as modal aspects.
>> >
>> > Best,
>> >
>> > Eric
>> >
>> >
>> >> On Jan 7, 2023, at 5:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson
>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> */The relation between the believed in and the True is the
>> relation between a limited function and its limit. {a vector, and the thing
>> toward which the vector points?] Ultimately the observations that the
>> function models determine/**/the limit, but the limit is not determined by
>> any particular observation or group of observations. Peirce believes that
>> The World -- if, in fact, it makes any sense to speak of a World independent
>> of the human experience -- is essentially random and, therefore, that
>> contingencies among experiences that lead to valid expectations are rare.
>> The apparition of order that we experience is due to the fact that such
>> predictive contingencies--rare as they may be-- are extraordinarily useful
>> to organisms and so organisms are conditioned to attend to them. Random
>> events are beyond experience. Order is what can be experienced. /*
>> >> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -..
>> .
>
> --
> ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ
> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives: 5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/-. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
