Ouch. My bad. I meant Solomon Feferman: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Feferman
I've mentioned him so many times on the list, I ass/u/me/d everyone would know who I meant. I'll try to do better in the future. On January 12, 2023 7:54:46 PM PST, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> wrote: >Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is following. > >Thank you so much for pitching in. As I have often said, I am incapable >of thinking alone, so your comments are wonderfully welcome. And thank you >also for confirming that what I wrote was readable. I am having to work in >gmail at the moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium. > >First, Eric: I am trying to talk math-talk in this passage, so poetry is >not an excuse if I fail to be understood by you. > >*FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the years, to the extent that >there is a productive analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my >words, and not trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between >states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation >of “what is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators in >statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate. We don’t have >any ontological problems understanding sample estimators and the quantities >estimated, as both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things. >In our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly play >different roles and stand for different concepts.* > >I like very much what you have written here and think it states, perhaps >more precisely than I managed, exactly what I was trying to say. I do want >to further stress the fact that if a measurement system is tracking a >variate that is going to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on >average approximate that value with greater precision the more measures are >taken. Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence constitute >evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that there is convergence >is evidence that there is a truth to be located. Thus I agree with you >that the idea behind Peirce's notion of truth is the central limit theorem. > >Where we might disagree is whether there is any meaning to truth beyond >that central limit. This is where I found you use of "ontology" so >helpful. When talking about statistics, we are always talking about >mathematical structures in experience and nothing beyond that. We are >assuredly talking about only one kind of thing. However, I see you >wondering, are there things to talk about beyond the statistical structures >of experience? I hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me wanting to >say "no". > >God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my hankering would seem to >be arrogant to the point of absurdity. Given all the forms of discourse in >which the words "truth" and "real" are used, all the myriad language games >in which these words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or Peirce) >claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the truth of any >proposition or the reality of any abject can be demonstrated? I think I >have to claim (and I think Peirce claims it) that whatever people may say >about how they evaluate truth or reality claims, their evaluation always >boils down to an appeal to the long run of experience. > >Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is perhaps related to the >difference of opinion between James and Peirce concerning the relation >between truth as a believed thing and truth as a thing beyond the belief of >any finite group of people. James was a physician, and presumably knew a >lot about the power of placebos. He also was a ditherer, who famously took >years to decide whom to marry and agonized about it piteously to his >siblings. James was fascinated by the power of belief to make things true >and the power of doubt to make them impossible. Who could jump a chasm who >did not believe that he could jump a chasm! For Peirce, this sort of >thinking was just empty psychologizing. Truth was indeed a kind of >opinion, but it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the >operation of scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably >converge. > >EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to say about this, including >that it is total garbage. > >As for Fefferman, my brief attempt to learn enough about Fefferman to >appear intelligent led me to the website, >http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html, which might be the weirdest >website I have ever gone to. I don't THINK that a language-free language >is my unicorn, but Glen NEVER says something for nothing, so I am >withholding judgement until he boxes my ears again. I think my unicorn may >be that all truth is statistical and, therefore, provisional. Literally: >a seeing into the future. > >Thanks again for helping out, you guys! > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
