OK. That makes sense. I'll clone your repos and play around with it. If I land
on any interesting ideas, I'll ping you there.
On 1/20/22 09:39, Jochen Fromm wrote:
It is just a very simple model, but it describes well in my opinion that..
+ autocracies have a tendency to remain stable because people get punished if
they do not cooperate and remain silent (think of all the people imprisoned in
Belarus now for example). Unrests do not necessarily succeed.
+ democracies are stable too - if institutions remain strong - because again
people get punished if they do not cooperate. In democracies the system
punishes criminals and people who break the law (like people who lie under oath
in court)
+ there can be transitions from democracies to autocracies that fail (the
Capitol riot Jan 6)
+ there can be transitions from autocracies to democracies that fail (for
example Belarus or the Arabic spring)
+ there can be transitions between both forms that succeed if the momentum is
high enough and the conditions are right
The cases I have selected seem to demonstrate these points. But you are right,
this could be formulated and shown more clearly.
Another aspect which is not covered yet is the influence of other countries.
Autocracies can support each other (for instance Russia helping Belarus and
Syria), and even democracies can help to stabilize autocracies if they can
exploit them successfully to get cheap resources like gas or oil. This can
probably be better described by a different model. Not sure how :-/
And I would really like to use an agent-based model to describe more complex
forms of democratic backsliding which explain the emergence of authoritarianism
and fascism in terms of evolutionary systems. I am not sure where to start, but
I think the models from Axelrod are a good starting point in general. He
managed to find simple models which have complex results. Finding the right
model and the right level of abstraction is difficult.
-J.
-------- Original message --------
From: glen <geprope...@gmail.com>
Date: 1/20/22 15:39 (GMT+01:00)
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling democratic backsliding
Why execute only the 3 games with only the 2 cases? Why not include at least
stag hunt for reference and maybe a couple of starting points in between like,
x∈{0.45,0.55}? Did you try such and see uninteresting curves? Or are the cases
you chose rhetorical?
On 1/15/22 05:00, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> I'm working on a kick-ass paper :-) which hopefully can be published in a journal like
https://www.jasss.org as your "My way or the highway" article a few years ago. Any
academics in their silverback phase interested in joining the attempt? I like David's
description of academics who take very crude models, and impose them on anything that can’t
get away, whether the models belong or not. The paper has everything:
>
> Crude model ✔
> A pinch of game theory ✔
> Application to an arbitrary domain ✔
>
> Here is the Jupyter notebook where I try to use the replicator equation for
the coordination game to model a transition from democracy to autocracy (and back):
>
https://nbviewer.org/github/JochenFromm/JupyterNotebooks/blob/master/ModelingDemocraticBacksliding.ipynb
--
glen
Theorem 3. There exists a double master function.
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