It is just a very simple model, but it describes well in my opinion that..+
autocracies have a tendency to remain stable because people get punished if
they do not cooperate and remain silent (think of all the people imprisoned in
Belarus now for example). Unrests do not necessarily succeed.+ democracies are
stable too - if institutions remain strong - because again people get punished
if they do not cooperate. In democracies the system punishes criminals and
people who break the law (like people who lie under oath in court)+ there can
be transitions from democracies to autocracies that fail (the Capitol riot Jan
6)+ there can be transitions from autocracies to democracies that fail (for
example Belarus or the Arabic spring) + there can be transitions between both
forms that succeed if the momentum is high enough and the conditions are
rightThe cases I have selected seem to demonstrate these points. But you are
right, this could be formulated and shown more clearly.Another aspect which is
not covered yet is the influence of other countries. Autocracies can support
each other (for instance Russia helping Belarus and Syria), and even
democracies can help to stabilize autocracies if they can exploit them
successfully to get cheap resources like gas or oil. This can probably be
better described by a different model. Not sure how :-/And I would really like
to use an agent-based model to describe more complex forms of democratic
backsliding which explain the emergence of authoritarianism and fascism in
terms of evolutionary systems. I am not sure where to start, but I think the
models from Axelrod are a good starting point in general. He managed to find
simple models which have complex results. Finding the right model and the right
level of abstraction is difficult.-J.
-------- Original message --------From: glen <geprope...@gmail.com> Date:
1/20/22 15:39 (GMT+01:00) To: friam@redfish.com Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Modeling
democratic backsliding Why execute only the 3 games with only the 2 cases? Why
not include at least stag hunt for reference and maybe a couple of starting
points in between like, x∈{0.45,0.55}? Did you try such and see uninteresting
curves? Or are the cases you chose rhetorical?On 1/15/22 05:00, Jochen Fromm
wrote:> I'm working on a kick-ass paper :-) which hopefully can be published in
a journal like https://www.jasss.org as your "My way or the highway" article a
few years ago. Any academics in their silverback phase interested in joining
the attempt? I like David's description of academics who take very crude
models, and impose them on anything that can’t get away, whether the models
belong or not. The paper has everything:> > Crude model ✔> A pinch of game
theory ✔> Application to an arbitrary domain ✔> > Here is the Jupyter notebook
where I try to use the replicator equation for the coordination game to model a
transition from democracy to autocracy (and back):>
https://nbviewer.org/github/JochenFromm/JupyterNotebooks/blob/master/ModelingDemocraticBacksliding.ipynb--
glenTheorem 3. There exists a double master function..-- .- -. - / .- -.-. -
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