I think we've gotten somewhere. Frank
----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 4:08 AM Prof David West <[email protected]> wrote: > Nick, > > No need to be ill at ease — I do not mean illusory in, or with, any > sense/degree/intimation of dualism. > > Ultimately, either: I am more of a monist than thou. Or, you are equally a > mystic as I. > > You cannot speak of Experience without explicitly or implicitly asserting > an Experiencer --->> dualism. If there is an Experience "of which you > cannot speak," or of which "whatever is spoken is incorrect or incomplete;" > then you are as much a mystic as Lao Tzu and the Tao. > > Because your sensibilities will not allow you to admit your mysticism, I > offer an alternative: you are an epistemological monist but not an > ontological monist. On the latter point; I have already accused you of > believing in an ontological "Thing" other than experience: a human soul or > essence or spirit. > > My monism is both ontological (except for the myth that infinitely long > ago, and infinitely in the future, there were two things "intelligence" and > "matter") and epistemological (accepting that my epistemology is ineffable). > > > davew > > > > On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 8:49 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > Hi, David, > > > > Thanks for channeling me so accurately. It is a talent to channel what > one does not agree with so faithfully that the person channeled is > satisfied. Thank you for that. > > > > I would have only one ill-ease, about the last part of your version: > > > > *both equally illusory.* > > > > I think “illusory” is used here, in your way, not in the way I would use > it, but to refer to the world that truly is but which we an never truly > grasp. I.e., dualistically. For me, an illusion is just an experience > that does not prove out. I arrive at my coffee house three days in a row > and there is a “day old” old-fashioned plain donut available for purchase > at half price. I experience that “donut at 4” is something I can count > on. That turns out not to be the case because, another customer starts > coming in at 3.59 and commandeering all the donuts. My experience was > illusory. Or, think flips of a coin. You flip a coin 7 times heads and > you come to the conclusion that the coin is biased. However, you flip it a > thousand times more and its behavior over the 1007 flips is consistent with > randomness. You come to the conclusion that the bias was probably an > illusion. > > > > My understanding of illusory is probabilistic and provisional. > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nick Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > *[email protected] > <[email protected]>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/>* > > > > > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West > *Sent:* Friday, December 6, 2019 10:16 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? > > > > I dare not really speak for Nick, but I think the essence of his position > is that there is no "out there" nor is there any "in here." There is only a > flow of "experience" that is sometimes "evaluated" (interpreted?) to a > false distinction of in or out — both equally illusory. > > > > davew > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 3:27 PM, John Kennison wrote: > > Hi Nick, and Eric, > > > > I am grappling with Nick's ideas that mental states must be physical > things and even are "out there" rather than "in here". What about > delusions? If I think I see bear in the woods but I am mistaken, is this > false perception "out there" even when the bear is not? > > > > --John > > > ------------------------------ > > > > *From:* Friam <[email protected]> on behalf of Eric Charles < > [email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, December 5, 2019 8:41 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* [EXT] Re: [FRIAM] A pluralistic model of the mind? > > > > Nick, > > Your need to complicate things is fascinating. You are a monist. You are a > monist is the sense of not thinking that "mental" things and "physical" > things are made of different stuffs. At that point, you can throw a new > word in the mix (e.g., 'experience', 'neutral stuff'), or you can throw > your hat in with one or the other side of the original division, e.g., "I > am a materialist" or "I am an idealist". To that, you add the insight that > that later discussion is all a bit weird, because once you have decided to > be a monist it weirdly doesn't matter much what you call the stuff.That > insight is in need of support, because the old dichotomy is so built in to > our language and culture that the claim it doesn't matter which side you > choose is very unintuitive. That is solid, and you should develop it > further. > > > > Instead, you bring up some sort of discussion about serial vs. parallel > processing that has nothing to do with that topic at all, then you muddle > the issues up. Whether you think of "consciousness" as "serial" or > "parallel" has no bearing on the prior issue. Given that you are talking > with a bunch of computationally minded people, and that you brought up > Turing Machines, the first problem is that a serial system can simulate a > parallel system, so while parallel buys you time savings (sometimes a > little, sometimes a lot), it doesn't change what the system is capable of > in any more fundamental way (assuming you are still limited to writing > zeros and ones). But you don't even need that, because it just doesn't > matter. Being a "monist" has nothing to do with the serial vs. parallel > issue at all. There is no reason a body can't be doing many things at once. > Or, you can change your level of analysis and somehow set up your > definition so that there is only one thing the body is doing, but that one > thing has parts. It is just a word game at that point. If I have a 5-berry > pie, is it 5 different types of pie at once, or is it its own 1 flavor of > pie? We can talk about the pros and cons of labeling it different ways, but > it is the same thing whichever way we label it.... and... it has nothing to > do with monism vs. dualism.... > > > > Admonishment over. > > > > So... Say more about the monism part... That is a solid issue and you are > getting somewhere with it... > > > > It SEEMS so important a difference if one person claims that all we can > never know is ideas ("You don't know 'the chair', just your idea of the > chair!") and another person claims that knowing isn't ever a thing and that > there is just material ("There is no 'idea' of the chair, there is only > your physical body in relation to the physical world!"). It seems that they > are making vastly different claims, and that they should disagree about > almost everything. How is it that THAT doesn't matter? > > > > Eric > > > > > > ----------- > > > > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > > American University - Adjunct Instructor > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 1:20 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi, everybody, > > > > I have gotten all the communications off of nabble and concentrated them > below. If you read this message in plain text, a lot of useful formatting > will go away, so I encourage you to enable HTML. Or perhaps, I can fit it > all up as a Word file, tomorrow. > > > > . I have not had time to dig into the contents much. I am pleased that > everybody took the issue straight on, and I look forward to grappling with > your comments. > > > > *A recapitulation of the thread:* > > > > First, some text from the review which Roger sent: > > > > *This is exactly as radical as it sounds. Bishop Berkeley and other > idealists argued that objects are dependent on mind; Manzotti argues the > reverse of this: Mind exists in objects. In The Spread Mind, Manzotti > contends that we are mistaken to believe that objects “do not depend on our > presence. . . . Our bodies enable processes that change the ontology of the > world. Our bodies bring into existence the physical objects with which our > experience is identical. We are our experience. We are not our bodies.” And > later: “We are the world and the world is us—everything is physical.” This > includes dreams, hallucinations, memories—all are the imagined physical > objects themselves, not neural firings or mental representations (we must > at one time have perceived an object to hallucinate or dream it, although > it can be an unreal combination of other objects, as in the case of flying > pink elephants). Manzotti impishly dubs this doctrine no-psychism. It’s > idealism turned on its head, a reductio ad absurdum of scientific > materialism. (If you’re confused, well, I’m not sure I understand it > myself, and I read the book.)* > > *Manzotti first drew Parks’s attention during a conference at IULM > University in Milan, where Parks is a professor, by bellowing “There are no > images!” in response to a neuroscientist’s discussion about how the brain > transforms visual stimuli into images. On Manzotti’s view, the brain does > nothing of the kind. There are no pictures, only objects. “He really > couldn’t believe how stupid we were all being, he said, buying into this > dumb story of images in our heads.” Parks was besotted.* > > *He could as easily have said “There are no objects, only pictures!” * > > > > *MY COMMENT ON THE REVIEW:* > > > > I think this review may be a wonderful example of what happens when a > (Romantic) dualist tries to explain monism to dualists. > > > > What nobody in this discussion seems to understand is that one can have > objects OR images BUT NOT BOTH. The lunacy begins when people imagine > that there are things outside of experience. Or experience outside of > things… really it doesn’t matter: they are both equally crazy. The fact > is, everything we know comes in over one channel – I call it experience – > and from that channel every form of experience is derived. So, images and > objects are not different sorts of stuff, they are arrangements of the same > stuff. And once you have agreed that there is only one kind of stuff, it > doesn’t make a damn bit of difference what you call it, “images” or > “objects”. > > > > Take phantom limb, for instance. I feel like I have a leg but when I put > my weight on it I fall down. Now the dualist will artificially divide > experience into the feeling that I have a leg (i.e., I start to put my > weight on it) and the experience of falling down, and call one the > ineffable experience the other the brute reality. But this is an > artificial division. Not falling down when you put your weight on your leg > is as much part of the experience of having a leg as expecting that you > wont fall down. > > > > This is where I always imagine that glen and I must ultimately find > agreement. He has to concede that he is a monist in that everything we > experience is, well, experience. I have to concede that I am a pluralist, > in that experience can be be organized in a zillion different forms > depending on how, and the degree to which, it proves out Hypothesis > testing is as much a part of experience as hypothesis formation. > > > > Now, there is a a hidden assumption in my monism which I would think you > computer folks would be all over me about. I am thinking of consciousness > as serial, rather than parallel. Where do I stand to assert that what ever > else can be said about experience, it comes down to a series of single, > instantaneous points from which all the varieties and forms of experience – > objects and fantasies, etc. – are constructed. This is where ProfDave has > me, because there is no more reason to believe on the basis of looking at > the brain that it has a single point of convergence, a choke point in its > processing, than to believe the same of the kidneys. Kidneys can make urine > and clean the blood at the same time. This is why I wish I understood the > Turing Model better, because I intuit that the computers we use are based > on just this seriel fallacy. Now, I suppose behavior provides something > like a choke point. We either walk to the supermarket or we drive. But we > may do a dozen different things on our way to the supermarket, whether or > not we walk and drive. We can listen to a pod cast, we can plan our summer > vacation, we can muse about which tuxedo we will wear for our Nobel > Address. And if we don’t, as I suspect Frank and Bruce will want us to, > artificially separate these musements from the circumstances that occasion > them and the actions they ultimately occasion, we will see that the myth of > the choke point (the fallacy of the turing machine model?) is contradicted > by the fact that we can do and do do many things at once all the time. > > > > > > *RESPONSES TO MY COMMENTS*: > > > > *Glen’s First* > > > > But why is serialization different from any other monist tendency? > Serialization is a reduction to the uni-dimensional *sequence*, whereas > parallel implies pluralism, anything > 1 dimension. It would be > inconsistent of you to allow for parallelism and retain your monism. So, to > me, you're better off sticking with a sequential conception. > > > > And don't forget, as we've discussed before, any output a parallel machine > can produce can be "simulated" by a sequential machine. So, again, monism > is moot. Yes, it may well be True in some metaphysical sense. But if it > walks like a pluralist and quacks like a pluralist ... well, then it's a > pluralist. > > > > Unification is only useful in so far as it *facilitates* multiplication, > i.e. demonstrates constructively how we get many things from few things. If > you can't show your work, then you don't understand the problem (or you > haven't read the instructions 8^). > > > > *Dave West’s Comment:* > > > > Nick, I read your Old New Realist paper, but to get a grip on it I must > read some Tolman and Holt - or at least it appears so. However, I have come > to one conclusion so far: that in your academic persona you are a committed > experience monist, but in your public/political persona you are an > irredemptive dualist, believing that humans have a soul/spirit/essence > apart from mere experience. (I know, how dare I cast such an aspersion?) > > > > Other things. I will not attempt to explain the Turing Model, others have > the technical expertise to do so, but I will speak a bit about the Turing > Metaphor. > > > > Metaphorically, a Turing machine is a device with three elements: a > read/write head, a set of instructions "in memory," and an infinite tape > divided into cells with each cell containing a 1 or 0. > > > > A cell of the tape is available to the read/write head and, depending on > the instructions in memory, will read or write (or both in sequence) and > advance or retire the tape for 1 to n positions. > > > > The Turing machine "computes" the tape and, simultaneously, the tape > "instructs" (programs) the computer (read/write head plus tape > advance-retire mechanism). > > > > The "instructions in memory" are just sequences of the same "stuff" — ones > and zeros — as the "stuff" on the tape. > > > > Subsequent to some "bootstrap" set of instructions (you have no interest > in "end cases" so I will not pursue), the "instructions in memory" can > originate on the tape, i.e. the tape contains both "program" and "data." As > the "instructions on tape" "move" to "instructions in memory," the > "instructions in memory" can become arbitrarily complicated. > > > > So far, nothing that contradicts your "experience monism." > > > > A favorite science fiction meme: once enough ones and zeros have moved > from the tape into "memory" the Turing Machine "wakes up" becomes > conscious. Instant dualism, but without much reason as mere "location" > changes nothing about the "stuff" which is still ones and zeros. (one > "stuff," two values) > > > > Because the tape is infinite in length, it matters not that it is "serial" > because any parallel computational experience can be replicated serially > just takes longer. > > > > Still nothing to interfere with your experience monism. The interesting > questions might be: > > > > 1- Is each individual human being a separate (but equal) instantiation of > a Turing Machine consuming a separate (but equal) infinite tape. If yes, > then the door seems to be opened for "private" experience/consciousness. > > > > 2- each human is a separate Turing Machine, but all consume the "same" > infinite tape. "Same" meaning mostly identical, but with some allowance for > perspective (slight variation in which portions of the tape are consumed > when??). I believe that this would be your preferred interpretation as it > might allow some kind of dialog among Turing machines as each one "wrote" > to the infinite tape that all were consuming and, perhaps, somehow, thereby > lead to some kind of "consensus computation." > > > > 3- there is but One Turing Machine, co-extensive with the Universe and One > infinite tape, also co-extensive with the Universe and therefore the > Universe is constantly "computing" itself. (Writing to the tape equals > popping quantum quiffs, i.e. collapsing wave functions by observing.) > > > > I am pretty certain that option three is the only one possible for one > committed to both ontological and epistemological monism. Ouroboros Rules!! > > > > *Glen’s Second:* > > > > Well, I did reply, as did Dave. If you're ever wondering whether someone > replied, you might check the archive at: > > http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=I3i4o%2FUwNgskuqC9FZm%2FJ7ih8ktHpk7XmBUVU2wsO8M%3D&reserved=0> > > > > Dave's was rather interesting w.r.t. Turing machines. Mine was more > flippant. But to continue mine, your discussion of serial attention or > behavior hearkens back to our prior discussions of quantum computing. > Parallelism vs. serial(ism? ... sequentialism?) can be monified/unified by > considering a 2 dimentional space of "space" vs time. In the ideal, even > things at, say, space = 1 billion can operate that the same *time* as > things at space = 1. Similarly, space at time = 1 billion can be at the > same position as time = 1. But reality doesn't work that way. And quantum > computing demonstrates this kinda-sorta painfully. But traditional > distributed computing demonstrates it, too. Parallel computations across > large spaces run into inter-process communication bottlenecks. I.e. sure, > we can have 10 computers compute the same thing with different inputs and > fuse the outputs. But we can't do the same thing with 1k computers without > having "bus" or "backbone" bandwidth problems. > > > > This sort of thing seems pragmatically clear when you talk about your > issues handling "serial consciousness". And, at risk of conflating 2 > unrelated weird things (quantum with consciousness) for no good reason, > there's a *coherence* to the parallel processing that goes on in quantum > computing that kinda-sorta feels like your reduction to a serial > attention/behavior in parsing consciousness. A loss of that coherence > results in separate things, whereas a retention of the coherence maintains > your "monism". But, in the end, it's all about the orthogonality between > space and time and the *scales* of space and time wherein such > orthogonality breaks down. > > > > I hope that's clear. I'm a bit occupied with debugging an uncooperative > simulation at the moment. > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=RDHisw3JFGEmSjT77Fl%2BA0v8pG8%2Bcp%2FBoh99Hbc9wv0%3D&reserved=0> > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=H2NpyLgc3eaJwlES6o90%2BvU0jUvVNWWGjpGfg%2FR8d34%3D&reserved=0> > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386679692&sdata=VnHPywdwh3fIha%2BF8j6HC3vpssUpGTxZUUXCIMsAZZk%3D&reserved=0> > by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fredfish.com%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffriam_redfish.com&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=Cy3zmueXnztFYde4YZESTlQrgSaePwNMk2XdjVndhTM%3D&reserved=0> > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386689685&sdata=QrCPHEda7eV5SFAREpst%2BPvOQQ3oH3WQHlSD9NGE7UY%3D&reserved=0> > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386699686&sdata=EJd2lqtzwaN16sf7wf5nAkcQqnk0iZr0PljsBpsKSuY%3D&reserved=0> > by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
