Hi Eric: > On Dec 30, 2018, at 9:33 PM, Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > "The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted > shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in > certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than > second-guessing that action. I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term > to something that could carry philosophical weight." > > Wait! Slow down! Why not see what happens when we ask that to carry > philosophical weight? > > What would get you to change your habits? Presumably a failure of the "act > without too much doubt" plan to work out as desired would eventually get you > to change how you act, right? > > What if you saw others acting without doubt in the same way, and they got > screwed as a result? Would that cause some doubt? > > If we follow this train if thought long enough, do we eventually end up > realizing it isn't just about what works for me-in-this-moment. Rather we end > up with something like: "Real" is how we awkwardly try to refer to the those > things we think will hold up over the long run of lots off people acting > without doubting it.
Yes; all this seems like the completely right development of the idea to me. > Now THAT sounds like it might be able carry some weight AND be true to your > intuition. I am happy with this too. Indeed if I were given time to, and compelled to, argue in a more structured way, I think this is the way I would find it natural to argue. I watch most of what transpires on this thread (and others) about the Pierce construction of truth, and find myself in agreement with it as a description of certainly my professional work, but also most of my casual modes of action. I guess I don’t want to pretend to be making a philosophical claim, when I understand that real philosophical arguments involve a lot of checking for formal consistency, and I know that my speech and action is dense with events that were never subjected to that effort. Conversational hygeine, or something like that. Many thanks, Eric > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, 7:43 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: > Hi, Everybody, > > > > I have been writing this email for most of the last week. > > > > While I am loath to argue with Frank on matters of logic and mathematics, I > think his solution violates Peirce’s project by making our understanding of > truth dependent on our understanding of Real, rather than, as Peirce would > have it, the other way around. So Frank is surely correct on his own terms, > but not Peircean, if you see what I mean. > > > > So, let me take a step back. Here is Thompson’s History of Modern > Philosophy. Once upon a time there was God. All-seeing, all-knowing God. > What God saw was Real and the Real was real whether or not anything, > anybody, other than God could see it. Then God died. “Sad”, as Trump would > say. But still there was Descartes’s (pronounced “day cart sez”) brain in a > vat. Everything that we experience could be like phantom limb experiences. > Phantom legs, phantom hands, phantom, sounds, phantom sights, phantom me, > phantom you, phantom thoughts, phantom WORLD. So, here we sit, you and I, > two brains in two vats, side by side. The devil tickles your nerves and you > see something you call, “horse”. So your motor nerves are excited and you > stimulate my auditory nerves with “horse”. Now unless the Devil happens to > simulate my nerves with exactly the same pattern as he stimulated yours > before you said “horse”, there is no possible way we could know if we are > talking about the same thing. And remember, that’s the thing about The Devil > (as we have recently learned), he has no commitment to the Truth. (Notice > how in this story God dies, yet the devil lives on; interesting; very sad) . > > > > Ok. What to do? Well, we could admit that we are screwed and define truth > as that which is beyond all experience. But this is nonsense, right? If > truth is beyond all experience, how do we come to be talking about it. If > Truth is that which we cannot talk about, then and any statement that we make > about it is necessarily untrue. What to do? Well, we could sneak a little > God back in. We could talk about true intuitions that come from the spirit > world, etc. Many people talk like that. Sometimes, I think of some of you > talk like that, tho I won’t name names. For me, that’s not a starter. > > > > So, Truth must be defined in terms of experience. Some kinds of experiences > are more enduring than others. They are the sorts of experiences that repeat > themselves day after day. They are the sorts of experiences that when you > tell them to other person, that person says, “Oh yeah, that happened to me.” > More formally, they are the sort of experiences that survive experiments, > both formal experiments and the little day to day experiments we try on the > world around us. Does the computer run on battery even when it is plugged > in? Run the battery down to zero, plug it in, and the computer won’t start > right away. Hmmm. Seems like. Does my love still love me? Oh, I will come > home from a business trip a day early and see if her eyes light up. Or > perhaps if a foreign car is parked in the driveway and the lights are out. > Love, power supplies, it’s all the same. It’s T.O.T.E, all the way down. > The most enduring experiences are those generated by communities of inquiry, > working at the same questions through rigorous experimentation and debate and > concerning themselves with abstract realities, force, momentum, lithium, etc. > After all, look at how the 19th Century produced the periodic table! Let’s > define Truth as the asymptote of that convergence. Truth is where the > community of inquiry will converge in the very long run. And real objects > can be something like, anything that is taken for granted by a true > proposition. The existence of unicorns is definitely NOT taken for granted > by the proposition, “No Unicorn Exists”, so that let’s us out of that box. > > > > Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all matters. > Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on the central > limit theorem. He cheerfully admits that the world we live in is essentially > random. However, if some things are not random, if there is systematic > pattern in our experience with regard to some things (such as, say, > saber-toothed tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know it, and > the cognitive systems around today would tend to be those that had not been > eaten by tigers, right? > > > > Ach! You protest! What kind of a lilly-livered reality is this?! We can > never know for sure whether some particular string of experiences is real or > not, whether it will endure to the endtimes, or whatever! Yup. That’s > right. The day you decide the stock is a good bet is the day it may fall 20 > percent. That’s pragmatism for you. We start in the middle, there are no > firm foundations, and everything is fallible. But what pragmatism tells you > is what Darwinian experience tells you: you bet your life everyday, and > sometimes you win and sometimes you lose. Those that bet right tend to be > the ones who are here to tell the story. And science is privileged because, > on the whole, over the long run, it has proved itself to be the best at > making those sorts of bets. > > > > Nick > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles > Sent: Monday, December 24, 2018 6:29 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction > > > > Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true > propositions of the form "x is real". > > > > I suspect that either begs the question or becomes a tautology. Compare: > Wouldn't it make more sense to say green things are subjects of true > propositions of the form "x is green". > > > > Though it seems convoluted, I think "Unicorns are not real" is best > understood as the assertion "Beliefs about unicorns are not true", which > unpacks to something like: "Beliefs about the category 'unicorns' will not > converge," which itself means, "if a community was to investigate claims > about unicorns, they would not evidence support of those claims over the > long haul." > > > > For that to work, we can't allow "nonexist" to be "a property." That is, we > have to distinguish ideas about unicorns from ideas about not-unicorns. > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 11:06 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net > wrote: > > Thanks, Frank. I thought at first that was a cheat, but it seems to work, > actually. It makes The Real dependent on The True, which is how Peirce > thinks it should be. > > > > I guess that’s why they paid you the big bucis. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly > Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 5:10 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction > > > > Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true > propositions of the form "x is real". > > ----------------------------------- > Frank Wimberly > > My memoir: > https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly > > My scientific publications: > https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 > > Phone (505) 670-9918 > > > > On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: > > Thanks, Eric, > > > > I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out. Thank > you. > > > > One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the > grammar of the two terms. True seems to apply only to propositions, while > real only to nouns. Now the way we get around that is by saying that the > real things are the objects of true proposition. But that leads to what I > call the unicorn problem. “Unicorns don’t exist” is a true proposition that > does not, however, make “unicorns” real. > > > > This seems like the kind of problem a sophomore might go crazy ab0ut in an > introductory philosophy course, so I am a bit embarrassed to be raising it. > For my philosophical mentors, it is beneath their contempt. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles > Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 4:02 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction > > > > I think Peirce is getting at something a bit different. When Peirce is on > good behavior, he is laying out The World According to The Scientist. When a > Scientist says that some claim is "true" she means that future studies will > continue to support the claim. Perhaps even a bit more than that, as she > means all investigations that could be made into the claim would support the > claim, whether they happen or not. Peirce also tells us that "real" is our > funny way of talking about the object of a true belief. If "I believe X" is a > statement about a true belief, then future investigations will not reveal > anything contradicting X, and... as a simple matter of definition... X is > real. > > > > When Peirce is first getting started, he seems to think that you could work > that logic through with just about any claim (and either find confirmation or > not). Did my aunt Myrtle screw up the salad dressing recipe back on June 1st, > 1972? Maybe we could descend upon that question using the scientific method > and figure it out! Why rule out that future generations could find a method > to perform the necessary studies? > > > > However, at some later point, I think Peirce really starts to get deeper into > his notion of the communal activity of science, as embodied by his beloved > early chemists. Did the honorable Mr. Durston really succeed in isolating > oxygen that one winter day, by exposing water to electricity under such and > such circumstances? Isn't that the thing Scientists argue over? Well, it > might be the type of thing people argue over, but is has little to do with > the doing of science. Individual events are simply not the type of thing that > scientists actually converge to agreement about using the scientific method; > the type of thing they converge upon is an agreement over whether or not the > described procedures contain some crucial aspect that would be necessary to > claim the described result. "Water" as an abstraction of sorts, under certain > abstract circumstances, with an abstracted amount of electricity applied, > will produce some (abstract) result. And by "abstract" I mean "not > particular". Scientists aren't arguing over whether some exact flow of > electrons, applied in this exact way, will turn this exact bit of water into > some exact bit of gas. They want to know if a flow of electrons with some > properties, applied in a principled fashion, will turn water-in-general into > some predictable amount of gas-with-particular-properties. We can tell this > when things go wrong: Were it found that some bit of water worked in a unique > seeming way, the scientists would descend upon it with experimental methods > until they found something about the water that allowed them to make an > abstract claim regarding water of such-and-such type. > > > > I suspect most on this list would agree, at least roughly, with what is > written above. > > > > Now, however, we must work our way backwards: > > * The types of beliefs about which a community of Scientists coverage upon > are abstractions, > > * the scientists converge upon those beliefs because the evidence bears them > out, > > * that the evidence bears out an idea is what we mean when we claim the > object of an idea is real. > > * Thus, at least for The Scientist, the only things that are "real" are > abstractions. > > > > In the very, very long run of intellectual activity, the ideas that are > stable are ideas about abstractions, which means that the object of those > ideas, the abstractions themselves, must be "real." > > > > (I feel like that was starting to get repetitive. I'll stop.) > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > > U.S. Marine Corps > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:38 PM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: > > Nick, > > > > Alas, I was not present to hear the inchoate discussion. Please allow me to > do some deconstruction and speculation on what you might be asking about. > > > > Imagine a vertical line and assume, metaphorically, that this is a 'membrane' > consisting of tiny devices that emit signals (electrical impulses) into that > which we presume to be 'inside that membrane'. I am trying to abstract the > common sense notion of an individual's 5 senses generating signals that go to > the brain — without making too many assumptions about the signal generators > and or the recipient of same. > > > > We tend to assume that the signal generators are not just randomly sending > off signals. Instead we assume that somewhere on the left side of the line is > a source of stimuli, each of which triggers a discrete signal generator which > we rename as a sensor. > > > > First question: do you assume / assert / argue that the "source" of each > stimulus (e.g. the Sun) and the means of conveying the stimulus (e.g. a > Photon) are "Real?" > > > > Signals are generated at the membrane and sent off somewhere towards the > right. > > > > Second question: do you assume a receiver of those signals, e.g. a > 'brain-body', and do you assume / argue / assert that the receiving entity is > "Real." > > > > If a signal is received by a brain-body and it reacts, e.g. a muscle > contraction; there are least two possible assumptions you can make: > > > > - some sort of 'hard wiring' exists that routes the signal to a set of > muscle cells which contract; and nothing has happened except the completion > of a circuit. Or, > > - the signal is "interpreted" in some fashion and the response to it is > at least quasi-voluntary. (Yogis and fakirs have demonstrated that very > little of what most of us would assume to be involuntary reactions, are, in > fact, beyond conscious control.) > > > > Third question: are both the 'interpretation' and the 'response' Real things? > > > > Depending on your answers, we might have a model of interacting "Real" > things: Source, Stimulus, Membrane, Signal, Interpretation, and Response. Or, > you might still wish to assert that all of these are "abstractions," but if > so, I really do not understand at all what you would mean by the term. > > > > But, you are an amenable chap and might assent to considering these things > "Real" in some sense, so we can proceed. > > > > The next step would be to question the existence of some entity receiving the > signals, effecting the interpretation, and instigating the response. Let's > call it a Mind or Consciousness. [Please keep the frustrated screaming to a > minimum.] > > > > It seems to me that this step is necessary, as it is only "inside" the mind > that we encounter abstractions. The abstractions might be unvoiced behaviors > — interpretations of an aggregate of stimuli as a "pattern" with a reflexive > response, both of which were non-consciously learned, e.g. 'flight or fight'. > Or, they might be basic naming; simple assertions using the verb to-be; or > complicated and convoluted constructs resulting from judicious, or egregious, > application of induction, deduction, and abduction. > > > > Fourth question: are these in-the-mind abstractions "Real?" > > > > At the core, your question seems to be an ontological / metaphysical one. Are > there two kinds of Thing: Real and Abstract? If so what criteria is used to > define membership in the two sets? It seems like your anti-dualism is leading > you to assert that there are not two sets, but one and that membership in > that set is defined by some criteria/characteristic of 'abstract-ness'. > > > > Please correct my failings at discerning the true nature of your question. > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 20, 2018, at 10:00 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > > Hi, Everybody, > > Yes. St. Johns Coffee Shop WILL be open this Friday. And then, not again > until the 3rd of January. I am hoping Frank will have some ideas for what we > do on the Friday between the two holidays. > > Attached please find the copy of an article you helped me write. Thanks to > all of you who listened patiently and probed insistently as I worked though > the issues of this piece. > > I need help with another article I am working with. Last week I found myself > making, and defending against your uproarious laughter, the proposition that > all real things are abstract. Some of you were prepared to declare the > opposite, No real things are abstract. However, it was late in the morning > and the argument never developed. > > I would argue the point in the following way: Let us say that we go along > with your objections and agree that “you can never step in the same river > twice.” This is to say, that what we call “The River” changes every time we > step in it. Wouldn’t it follow that any conversation we might have about The > River is precluded? We could not argue, for instance, about whether the > river is so deep that we cannot cross o’er because there is no abstract fact, > “The River” that connects my crossing with yours. > > Let’s say, then, that you agree with me that implicit in our discussions of > the river is the abstract conception of The River. But, you object, that we > assume it, does not make it true. Fair enough. But why then, do we engage > in the measurement of anything? > > I realize this is not everybody’s cup of tea for a conversation, but I wanted > to put it on the table. > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > Email had 1 attachment: > > • BP 2018 (Thompson) (in press).pdf > 640k (application/pdf) > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
