Sorry, Eric, 

 

Am missing the post to which this was a response.  L

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2018 9:33 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

"The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than second-guessing 
that action.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term to something that 
could carry philosophical weight."

Wait! Slow down! Why not see what happens when we ask that to carry 
philosophical weight?

 

What would get you to change your habits? Presumably a failure of the "act 
without too much doubt" plan to work out as desired would eventually get you to 
change how you act,  right?

 

What if you saw others acting without doubt in the same way,  and they got 
screwed as a result? Would that cause some doubt?

 

If we follow this train if thought long enough,  do we eventually end up 
realizing it isn't just about what works for me-in-this-moment. Rather we end 
up with something like: "Real" is how we awkwardly try to refer to the those 
things we think will hold up over the long run of lots off people acting 
without doubting it. 

 

Now THAT sounds like it might be able carry some weight AND be true to your 
intuition.   

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, 7:43 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net 
<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Hi, Everybody, 

 

I have been writing this email for most of the last week.

 

While I am loath to argue with Frank on matters of logic and mathematics, I 
think his solution violates Peirce’s project by making our understanding of 
truth dependent on our understanding of Real, rather than, as Peirce would have 
it, the other way around.   So Frank is surely correct on his own terms, but 
not Peircean, if you see what I mean.  

 

So, let me take a step back.  Here is Thompson’s History of Modern Philosophy.  
Once upon a time there was God.  All-seeing, all-knowing God.  What God  saw 
was Real and the Real was real whether or not anything, anybody, other than God 
could see it.  Then God died.  “Sad”, as Trump would say.  But still there was 
Descartes’s (pronounced “day cart sez”) brain in a vat.  Everything that we 
experience could be like phantom limb experiences.  Phantom legs, phantom 
hands, phantom, sounds, phantom sights, phantom me, phantom you, phantom 
thoughts, phantom WORLD.  So, here we sit, you and I, two brains in two vats, 
side by side.  The devil tickles your nerves and you see something you call, 
“horse”.  So your motor nerves are excited and you stimulate my auditory nerves 
with “horse”.   Now unless the Devil happens to simulate my nerves with exactly 
the same pattern as he stimulated yours before you said “horse”, there is no 
possible way we could know if we are talking about the same thing.  And 
remember, that’s the thing about The Devil (as we have recently learned), he 
has no commitment to the Truth.  (Notice how in this story God dies, yet the 
devil lives on; interesting; very sad) .  

 

Ok.  What to do?  Well, we could admit that we are screwed and define truth as 
that which is beyond all experience.  But this is nonsense, right?  If truth is 
beyond all experience, how do we come to be talking about it.  If Truth is that 
which we cannot talk about, then and any statement that we make about it is 
necessarily untrue.  What to do?  Well, we could sneak a little God back in.  
We could talk about true intuitions that come from the spirit world, etc.  Many 
people talk like that.  Sometimes,  I think of some of you talk like that, tho 
I won’t name names.  For me, that’s not a starter.  

 

So, Truth must be defined in terms of experience.  Some kinds of experiences 
are more enduring than others.  They are the sorts of experiences that repeat 
themselves day after day.  They are the sorts of experiences that when you tell 
them to other person, that person says, “Oh yeah, that happened to me.”  More 
formally, they are the sort of experiences that survive experiments, both 
formal experiments and the little day to day experiments we try on the world 
around us.  Does the computer run on battery even when it is plugged in? Run 
the battery down to zero, plug it in, and the computer won’t start right away. 
Hmmm. Seems like.  Does my love still love me?  Oh, I will come home from a 
business trip a day early and see if her eyes light up.  Or perhaps if a 
foreign car is parked in the driveway and the lights are out.  Love, power 
supplies, it’s all the same.  It’s T.O.T.E, all the way down.  The most 
enduring experiences are those generated by communities of inquiry, working at 
the same questions through rigorous experimentation and debate and concerning 
themselves with abstract realities, force, momentum, lithium, etc.  After all, 
look at how the 19th Century produced the periodic table!  Let’s define Truth 
as the asymptote of that convergence.  Truth is where the community of inquiry 
will converge in the very long run.  And real objects can be something like, 
anything that is taken for granted by a true proposition.   The existence of 
unicorns is definitely NOT taken for granted by the proposition, “No Unicorn 
Exists”, so that let’s us out of that box.  

 

Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all matters.  
Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on the central 
limit theorem.  He cheerfully admits that the world we live in is essentially 
random.  However, if some things are not random, if there is systematic pattern 
in our experience with regard to some things (such as, say, saber-toothed 
tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know it, and the cognitive 
systems around today would tend to be those that had not been eaten by tigers, 
right?  

 

Ach! You protest!  What kind of a lilly-livered reality is this?! We can never 
know for sure whether some particular string of experiences is real or not, 
whether it will endure to the endtimes, or whatever!  Yup.  That’s right.  The 
day you decide the stock is a good bet is the day it may fall 20 percent.  
That’s pragmatism for you.  We start in the middle, there are no firm 
foundations, and everything is fallible.  But what pragmatism tells you is what 
Darwinian experience tells you:  you bet your life everyday, and sometimes you 
win and sometimes you lose.  Those that bet right tend to be the ones who are 
here to tell the story.  And science is privileged because, on the whole, over 
the long run, it has proved itself to be the best at making those sorts of 
bets. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> ] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Monday, December 24, 2018 6:29 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com 
<mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is real".

 

I suspect that either begs the question or becomes a tautology.  Compare: 
Wouldn't it make more sense to say green things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is green".

 

Though it seems convoluted,  I think "Unicorns are not real" is best understood 
as the assertion "Beliefs about unicorns are not true", which unpacks to 
something like: "Beliefs about the category 'unicorns' will not converge," 
which itself means,  "if a community was to investigate claims about unicorns,  
they would not evidence support of those claims over the long haul." 

 

For that to work,  we can't allow "nonexist" to be "a property." That is,  we 
have to distinguish ideas about unicorns from ideas about not-unicorns. 

 

 

 

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 11:06 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net 
<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Thanks, Frank.  I thought at first that was a cheat, but it seems to work, 
actually.  It makes The Real dependent on The True, which is how Peirce thinks 
it should be.  

 

I guess that’s why they paid you the big bucis. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto: <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> 
friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 5:10 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < 
<mailto:friam@redfish.com> friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is real".

-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net 
<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Thanks, Eric, 

 

I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out.  Thank 
you. 

 

One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the 
grammar of the two terms.  True seems to apply only to propositions, while real 
only to nouns.  Now the way we get around that is by saying that the real 
things are the objects of true proposition.  But that leads to what I call the 
unicorn problem.  “Unicorns don’t exist” is a true proposition that does not, 
however, make “unicorns” real.  

 

This seems like the kind of problem a sophomore might go crazy ab0ut in an 
introductory philosophy course, so I am a bit embarrassed to be raising it.  
For my philosophical mentors, it is beneath their contempt.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto: <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> 
friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 4:02 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < 
<mailto:friam@redfish.com> friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

I think Peirce is getting at something a bit different. When Peirce is on good 
behavior, he is laying out The World According to The Scientist. When a 
Scientist says that some claim is "true" she means that future studies will 
continue to support the claim. Perhaps even a bit more than that, as she means 
all investigations that could be made into the claim would support the claim, 
whether they happen or not. Peirce also tells us that "real" is our funny way 
of talking about the object of a true belief. If "I believe X" is a statement 
about a true belief, then future investigations will not reveal anything 
contradicting X, and... as a simple matter of definition... X is real. 

 

When Peirce is first getting started, he seems to think that you could work 
that logic through with just about any claim (and either find confirmation or 
not). Did my aunt Myrtle screw up the salad dressing recipe back on June 1st, 
1972? Maybe we could descend upon that question using the scientific method and 
figure it out! Why rule out that future generations could find a method to 
perform the necessary studies?

 

However, at some later point, I think Peirce really starts to get deeper into 
his notion of the communal activity of science, as embodied by his beloved 
early chemists. Did the honorable Mr. Durston really succeed in isolating 
oxygen that one winter day, by exposing water to electricity under such and 
such circumstances? Isn't that the thing Scientists argue over? Well, it might 
be the type of thing people argue over, but is has little to do with the doing 
of science. Individual events are simply not the type of thing that scientists 
actually converge to agreement about using the scientific method; the type of 
thing they converge upon is an agreement over whether or not the described 
procedures contain some crucial aspect that would be necessary to claim the 
described result. "Water" as an abstraction of sorts, under certain abstract 
circumstances, with an abstracted amount of electricity applied, will produce 
some (abstract) result. And by "abstract" I mean "not particular".  Scientists 
aren't arguing over whether some exact flow of electrons, applied in this exact 
way, will turn this exact bit of water into some exact bit of gas. They want to 
know if a flow of electrons with some properties, applied in a principled 
fashion, will turn water-in-general into some predictable amount of 
gas-with-particular-properties. We can tell this when things go wrong: Were it 
found that some bit of water worked in a unique seeming way, the scientists 
would descend upon it with experimental methods until they found something 
about the water that allowed them to make an abstract claim regarding water of 
such-and-such type.   

 

I suspect most on this list would agree, at least roughly, with what is written 
above. 

 

Now, however, we must work our way backwards: 

*  The types of beliefs about which a community of Scientists coverage upon are 
abstractions, 

*  the scientists converge upon those beliefs because the evidence bears them 
out, 

*  that the evidence bears out an idea is what we mean when we claim the object 
of an idea is real. 

*  Thus, at least for The Scientist, the only things that are "real" are 
abstractions. 

 

In the very, very long run of intellectual activity, the ideas that are stable 
are ideas about abstractions, which means that the object of those ideas, the 
abstractions themselves, must be "real." 

 

(I feel like that was starting to get repetitive. I'll stop.) 

 


-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps

 

 

On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:38 PM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm 
<mailto:profw...@fastmail.fm> > wrote:

Nick,

 

Alas, I was not present to hear the inchoate discussion. Please allow me to do 
some deconstruction and speculation on what you might be asking about.

 

Imagine a vertical line and assume, metaphorically, that this is a 'membrane' 
consisting of tiny devices that emit signals (electrical impulses) into that 
which we presume to be 'inside that membrane'. I am trying to abstract the 
common sense notion of an individual's 5 senses generating signals that go to 
the brain — without making too many assumptions about the signal generators and 
or the recipient of same.

 

We tend to assume that the signal generators are not just randomly sending off 
signals. Instead we assume that somewhere on the left side of the line is a 
source of stimuli, each of which triggers a discrete signal generator which we 
rename as a sensor.

 

First question: do you assume / assert / argue that the "source" of each 
stimulus (e.g. the Sun) and the means of conveying the stimulus (e.g. a Photon) 
are "Real?"

 

Signals are generated at the membrane and sent off somewhere towards the right. 

 

Second question: do you assume a receiver of those signals, e.g. a 
'brain-body', and do you assume / argue / assert that the receiving entity is 
"Real."

 

If a signal is received by a brain-body and it reacts, e.g. a muscle 
contraction; there are least two possible assumptions you can make:

 

   -  some sort of 'hard wiring' exists that routes the signal to a set of 
muscle cells which contract; and nothing has happened except the completion of 
a circuit. Or,

   -  the signal is "interpreted" in some fashion and the response to it is at 
least quasi-voluntary. (Yogis and fakirs have demonstrated that very little of 
what most of us would assume to be involuntary reactions, are, in fact, beyond 
conscious control.)

 

Third question: are both the 'interpretation' and the 'response' Real things?

 

Depending on your answers, we might have a model of interacting "Real" things: 
Source, Stimulus, Membrane, Signal, Interpretation, and Response. Or, you might 
still wish to assert that all of these are "abstractions," but if so, I really 
do not understand at all what you would mean by the term.

 

But, you are an amenable chap and might assent to considering these things 
"Real" in some sense, so we can proceed.

 

The next step would be to question the existence of some entity receiving the 
signals, effecting the interpretation, and instigating the response. Let's call 
it a Mind or Consciousness. [Please keep the frustrated screaming to a minimum.]

 

It seems to me that this step is necessary, as it is only "inside" the mind 
that we encounter abstractions. The abstractions might be unvoiced behaviors — 
interpretations of an aggregate of stimuli as a "pattern" with a reflexive 
response, both of which were non-consciously learned, e.g. 'flight or fight'.  
Or, they might be basic naming; simple assertions using the verb to-be; or 
complicated and convoluted constructs resulting from judicious, or egregious, 
application of induction, deduction, and abduction.

 

Fourth question: are these in-the-mind abstractions "Real?"

 

At the core, your question seems to be an ontological / metaphysical one. Are 
there two kinds of Thing: Real and Abstract? If so what criteria is used to 
define membership in the two sets? It seems like your anti-dualism is leading 
you to assert that there are not two sets, but one and that membership in that 
set is defined by some criteria/characteristic of 'abstract-ness'.

 

Please correct my failings at discerning the true nature of your question.

 

dave west

 

 

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018, at 10:00 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Hi, Everybody,

 

Yes.  St. Johns Coffee Shop WILL be open this Friday.  And then, not again 
until the 3rd of January.  I am hoping Frank will have some ideas for what we 
do on the Friday between the two holidays. 

 

Attached please find the copy of an article you helped me write.  Thanks to all 
of you who listened patiently and probed insistently as I worked though the 
issues of this piece.

 

I need help with another article I am working with.  Last week I found myself 
making, and defending against your uproarious laughter, the proposition that 
all real things are abstract.  Some of you were prepared to declare the 
opposite, No real things are abstract.  However, it was late in the morning and 
the argument never developed. 

 

I would argue the point in the following way:  Let us say that we go along with 
your objections and agree that “you can never step in the same river twice.”  
This is to say, that what we call “The River” changes every time we step in it. 
 Wouldn’t it follow that any conversation we might have about The River is 
precluded?  We could not argue, for instance, about whether the river is so 
deep that we cannot cross o’er because there is no abstract fact, “The River” 
that connects my crossing with yours. 

 

Let’s say, then, that you agree with me that implicit in our discussions of the 
river is the abstract conception of The River.  But, you object, that we assume 
it, does not make it true.  Fair enough.  But why then, do we engage in the 
measurement of anything? 

 

I realize this is not everybody’s cup of tea for a conversation, but I wanted 
to put it on the table.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

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