Russ,

 

You asked:  Did becoming an experience monist change your life in any way?

 

Exactly the right question to ask a pragmatist.  If there is one thing a 
pragmatist should not be caught asserting is a distinction that does not make a 
difference. 

 

I don’t think, as I said, there is a lot of difference in what follows from 
different sorts of monism.  What I will argue is that being a monist rather 
than a dualist  makes a difference.  But I won’t argue it now, because I am 
frantically getting ready to return to New England.  You and I have had our 
most useful arguments in June, when I am stuck in the clammy fogs that can 
sometimes press in from the Atlantic.  When the wind goes NE, you will hear 
from me.  

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 4:17 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.

 

That sounds a lot like what Strawson was saying.

 

Did becoming an experience monist change your life in any way?

 

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:50 AM Nick Thompson <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Geez, Russ, who would have thought you were such a handsome old dog. 

 

Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to “Thompsonism”.  And 
which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we have been corresponding, you 
and I, I have gone from being a materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that 
exists consists of matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS 
Peirce (“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, 
matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns in 
experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience monism and 
any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more honest and radical in 
its monism.  On that view, there is nothing outside of experience-- talk of 
“experience of X” is all nonsense, unless, of course, X is another experience – 
nor is there any place for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these 
manifest themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as 
scientists is to describe the experiences  that anchor our references tomind, 
and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, 
experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as 
“consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?  

 

Nick   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 11:48 AM
To: FRIAM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.

 

An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized 
<https://plus.google.com/u/0/+RussAbbott1/posts/XfJg2mEmwcw>  Galen Strawson's 
piece in the NYT on consciousness. 

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