One things many philosophers might point out in response to such an assertion, is that we don't have a very good handle on the notion of "determined'. In fact, there are quite a few big-named dead white guys, who would say that physical causality and mental causality are equally illusory (and by that, I mean, completely illusory). Thus, one of the BIG challenges for a realist philosophy is articulating a theory of causality. It is not nearly as simple as basic physics, with its naive realism, might make you think.
In the last real chapter of my up-coming book on Holt (Nick circulated his chapter a little bit ago), Alan Costall argues (among other things) that naive realism leads to physics, and that physics undercuts naive realism, leaving the whole thing a big mess. Eric On Sun, Jun 5, 2011 04:30 PM, Marcos <stalkingt...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> > > >>Not to mention, the white elephant in the room (which I brought up to Murray Gell-Mann to no avail), the relationship of consciousness to matter, and by implication: physics. To say consciousness is only a emergent property of matter, is to say that we're all deterministic robots, however transient within the view of cosmological history. >> > >>That position, for me, is no longer tenable. >> > >>mark > ============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > Eric Charles Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
