Sorry. I knew it was Eric. My mistake.  But this time it really is Nick I'm
responding to.


*nst --> I thought that Russ's  position was that one cannot IN PRINCIPLE
know what is truly in another's mind

**Russ*: No. I don't believe that. In fact, I expect that with advanced
enough technology we will be able to experience what another experiences.

*nst --> Just to re-iterate that our argument is not about the existence of
mental life; it is about what we actually are talking about when we talk
about mental life.   I think we are talking about third person things, or
things that a third person could in principle "see".
*

*Russ*: I'm not sure what that means. I've been talking about *the existence
* of mental life. If you aren't denying the existence of mental life, I have
no idea why we had this conversation. I thought I was defending its
existence against your arguments opposing it..

I have not been talking about third person things. Mental life is by
definition first person. And when I said above that I expect that we will be
able to experience what another experiences, I mean that by hooking us up
appropriately, my first person experience will be very much the same as
yours.


I think we really have exhausted this conversation.  Or probably more
accurately, it has exhausted us -- or at least me.


-- Russ

On Sun, Jun 21, 2009 at 9:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <
[email protected]> wrote:

>  Russ,
>
> Actually, I didnt write what you are countering, here,  but I will defend
> it anyway.
>
>
>
>  Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([email protected])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>  *From:* Russ Abbott <[email protected]>
> *To: *[email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
> Coffee Group <[email protected]>
> *Sent:* 6/21/2009 4:18:52 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Behaviorist Federal Judge
>
> See below.
>
> -- Russ Abbott
> _____________________________________________
> Professor, Computer Science
> California State University, Los Angeles
> Cell phone: 310-621-3805
> o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 21, 2009 at 2:56 PM, Nicholas Thompson <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> it cannot be the case, pragmatically speaking, that we let other people
>> live because they have an inner life. We all know this cannot be true (Russ
>> included), because one of the axiomatic assumptions for these conversations
>> is that you cannot directly know someone else's mental life. If you cannot
>> know whether or not someone has a mental life, you can't decide whether or
>> not you can kill them based on their having a mental life. Is there any way
>> to make that more obvious?!?
>
>
> I see four problem.
>
>    1. The argument mixes epistemology with ontology. It's one thing to
>    discuss what we can and cannot know -- which tends to change with 
> technology
>    and our level of sophistication. It's another to discuss what is. Unless 
> you
>    want to take the position that one cannot talk about what is and can only
>    talk about what can be known, these two should be kept separate.  *nst
>    -->I thought that Russ's  position was that one cannot IN PRINCIPLE know
>    what is truly in another's mind*
>
> No. I don't believe that. In fact, I suspect that with advanced enough
technology we will be able to experience what another experiences.

>
>    1. **
>
>
>
>    1. An argument can be made that nothing can really be known. After all,
>    what is it to know something?  No matter what one does, one can never be
>    sure.  *nst --> Yes, but such sweeping arguments are without force;
>    since they apply to all knowledge, they dont give one any information about
>    any special features of consciousness, or anything else for that matter.
>    More over, they self distruct, since they apply to themselves.  *
>    2. To know something implies a knower, which relies on a mental life. *nst
>    --> Just to re-iterate that our argument is not about the existence of
>    mental life; it is about what we actually are talking about when we talk
>    about mental life.   I think we are talking about third person things, or
>    things that a third person could in principle "see".  *
>    3. Simply making the argument and expecting someone to understand it
>    makes no sense unless one assumes a mental life in the speaker and the
>    listener. Without that, all we have are photons generated by a CRT or bits
>    stored in a computer, etc. *nst --> Again, I disagree.  What is
>    "mental" adding, here?  Without LIFE, all we have are photons etc.  *
>
>
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