Russ, 

Actually, I didnt write what you are countering, here,  but I will defend it 
anyway.  



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, 
Clark University ([email protected])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/




----- Original Message ----- 
From: Russ Abbott 
To: [email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee 
Group
Sent: 6/21/2009 4:18:52 PM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Behaviorist Federal Judge


See below.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: 310-621-3805
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/



On Sun, Jun 21, 2009 at 2:56 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> 
wrote:

it cannot be the case, pragmatically speaking, that we let other people live 
because they have an inner life. We all know this cannot be true (Russ 
included), because one of the axiomatic assumptions for these conversations is 
that you cannot directly know someone else's mental life. If you cannot know 
whether or not someone has a mental life, you can't decide whether or not you 
can kill them based on their having a mental life. Is there any way to make 
that more obvious?!? 

I see four problem.

The argument mixes epistemology with ontology. It's one thing to discuss what 
we can and cannot know -- which tends to change with technology and our level 
of sophistication. It's another to discuss what is. Unless you want to take the 
position that one cannot talk about what is and can only talk about what can be 
known, these two should be kept separate.  nst -->I thought that Russ's  
position was that one cannot IN PRINCIPLE know what is truly in another's mind


An argument can be made that nothing can really be known. After all, what is it 
to know something?  No matter what one does, one can never be sure.  nst --> 
Yes, but such sweeping arguments are without force; since they apply to all 
knowledge, they dont give one any information about any special features of 
consciousness, or anything else for that matter.  More over, they self 
distruct, since they apply to themselves.  

To know something implies a knower, which relies on a mental life. nst --> Just 
to re-iterate that our argument is not about the existence of mental life; it 
is about what we actually are talking about when we talk about mental life.   I 
think we are talking about third person things, or things that a third person 
could in principle "see".  

Simply making the argument and expecting someone to understand it makes no 
sense unless one assumes a mental life in the speaker and the listener. Without 
that, all we have are photons generated by a CRT or bits stored in a computer, 
etc. nst --> Again, I disagree.  What is "mental" adding, here?  Without LIFE, 
all we have are photons etc.  
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