See below. -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles Cell phone: 310-621-3805 o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/
On Sat, Jun 20, 2009 at 7:09 AM, Nicholas Thompson < [email protected]> wrote: > Comments below in *bold comic blue* > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Russ Abbott <[email protected]> > *To: *[email protected];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 6/19/2009 11:31:47 PM > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Foundations for ethics (was Re: (Subjective) > experience) > > We've definitely exhausted the subject. But I can't resist two things. > > 1. Ethics is the study of moral systems. The following parallelism seems to > work. Ethics is to systems of morality as psychology is to whatever it is > that psychologists study. An ethical theory is to ethics as behaviorism is > to psychology. > > *nst --> Ok. In that case, sociobiology is an ethical theory, right? It > explains ethics. Have I got it? So, from your point of view, I am an > ethical naturalist to the extent that I am happy to explain why people are > ethical (to the extent that they are), as, indeed, I usually am. * > > I have no problem categorizing sociobiology as an ethical theory. It's a nice way of putting it to say that an ethical naturalist attempts to explain why people are ethical. I think I said more or less the same thing as I think you are implying: that ethical behavior is built upon our nature as human beings. > ** > > 2. Nick wrote, > Rather than say that because I know what it is to have muscle pain, I feel > my old dog's pain when he walks with a limp, it makes more sense to say > that I touch painful walking through the dog. No, don't laugh. Think about > the last time you hit a tennis ball. Think about the feel of the ball, of > its resistance. Great feeling, huh! No. Hold on! You lied to me! I have > to bet you have NEVER hit a tennis ball in your life! The RACKET hit the > tennis ball. And just as the racket can become in instrument for feeling a > ball, an old dog can become an instrument for touching pain. > In particular you wrote, "just as the racket can become [an] instrument > for feeling a ball". Since you continue to use phrases like "feeling the > ball" I can't understand why you object when I use the same sort of phrase. > Also, if it makes you feel better to say "touch" rather than "feel" I guess > I'll just understand you to mean "feel" when you say "touch," and you should > translate my use of "feel" to be "touch" in your language. I assume also > that when you said "feel the ball", you really meant to say "touch the ball" > but that you slipped up. Is that right, or were you deliberately > distinguishing between feeling and touching? If so,what distinction you are > trying to convey? > > *nst --> Once again, since you disclaimed interest in the Cartesian > Theatre model I have had a harder time understanding where we disagree. I > certainly don't deny that creatures with sensory systems experience the > world. I experience the world. you experience the world. "Touch" the > world, "feel" the world, it doesnt matter to me. To me, literally, touch is > to encounter with an extended finger, feel is to encounter with the whole > hand. A similar distinction might be found between their metaphorical > extensions. * > > I wish you had said that this was all about the Cartesian Theater. As I said, the Catesian Theater contains an obvious infinite regress. I don't know of anyone who seriously argues for the Cartesian Theater. If you are comfortable saying things like "I experience the world." then that seems to me to be good enough. I'm not sure I know how you will elaborate what you mean by that -- and perhaps we should just leave it at that. I'm also not sure how you would understand "I feel nauseous" since I don't feel nauseous with my whole hand. But if you don't mind that sort of statements, then I guess we are in agreement. I think that the problem arises when you attempt to elaborate what you mean. If you say that "I feel nauseous" means something like certain sensors have certain readings. then that seems to imply a Cartesian Theater with a homunculus who is reading those sensors. So I'm still confused about what you mean and how a robot could feel nauseous. But perhaps we are just fated not to make sense to each other. > ** > ** > * I also experience [that you experience the world]; you also experience > [that I experience the world]. In exactly that same sense, and by exactly > the same means, (but with different data) I experience [that I experience > the world]. But what is crucial here is that I dont need to experience > [that I experience the world ] in order to experience the world. * > > > > -- Russ > > *nst --> Nick * > >
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