Dear Glen, and lurkers, The mirror neuron thing is mind blowing. I have always found imitation mysterious, because I could never learn Greek dancing, even when others were willing to carry me around on their shoulders while I wiggled my feet ineffectually in the air. So, suddenly there are neurons that can learn Greek dancing. Just didn't seem fair.
Mirror neurons have been taken to support the so called "Theory of MInd". To save you all the trouble of going to WikiPedia, I will key in the relevant passage below. Not to put too fine a point on it, TOM is the gol-derned silliest idea that was ever foisted on the world. It is the idea that knowledge of our emotional states is given and that we use that knowledge to attribute emotional states to others. Like, because I smile when I am happy I know that you are happy when you smile. But how did I come by the knowledge that I am happy except by smiling? (CF James-Lange theory of emotions.) to me the whole flow of knowledge of mental states is in the other direction, from observation of others to inferences about the self. Think about what happens when you are tired. Have you noticed that other people start to behave stupidly when you are tired. Have you noticed that the kids are always louder when you have a headache. Emotional perception is like a constancy problem. Think about the illuminated Gelb disk that looks a brilliant white when in fact it is dark. Why? because it is illuminated by a hidden light source, and your visual system cannot separate out the incident light. When you are tired or have a headache, you are hard pressed not to interpret your own heightened sensitivity as a fact about the world, rather than about your self. Your irritability illuminates the ordinary stupidity of others. Recognizing one's own "internal" states is a cognitive achievement, not something that is naively known. And once one has figured out that one is localized in one of those big lumbering objects out there that is irritable on some days and sweet and loving on others, one is in a much better position to say, "hey! All the people in the room haven't suddenly gotten stupid! My big lumbering object is irritable!. Even empathy is better understood if one thinks from outside to inside, rather than the other way around. Rather than say that because I know what it is to have muscle pain, I feel my old dog's pain when he walks with a limp, it makes more sense to say that I touch painful walking through the dog. No, don't laugh. Think about the last time you hit a tennis ball. Think about the feel of the ball, of its resistance. Great feeling, huh! No. Hold on! You lied to me! I have to bet you have NEVER hit a tennis ball in your life! The RACKET hit the tennis ball. And just as the racket can become in instrument for feeling a ball, an old dog can become an instrument for touching pain. (I owe this example to the phenomenologist Kenneth Shapiro.) Ok. So now you KNOW I am nuts. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([email protected]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ Below is the wikipedia passage: In Philosophy of mind, mirror neurons have become the primary rallying call of simulation theorists concerning our 'theory of mind.' 'Theory of mind' refers to our ability to infer another person's mental state (i.e., beliefs and desires) from their experiences or their behavior. For example, if you see a person reaching into a jar labeled 'cookies,' you might assume that he wants a cookie (even if you know the jar is empty) and that he believes there are cookies in the jar. There are several competing models which attempt to account for our theory of mind; the most notable in relation to mirror neurons is simulation theory. According to simulation theory, theory of mind is available because we subconsciously empathize with the person we're observing and, accounting for relevant differences, imagine what we would desire and believe in that scenario.[55][56] Mirror neurons have been interpreted as the mechanism by which we simulate others in order to better understand them, and therefore their discovery has been taken by some as a validation of simulation theory (which appeared a decade before the discovery of mirror neurons).[57] More recently, Theory of Mind and Simulation have been seen as complementary systems, with different developmental time courses.[ > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[email protected]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> > Date: 6/19/2009 4:51:58 PM > Subject: [FRIAM] Foundations for ethics (was Re: (Subjective) experience) > > Russ Abbott emitted this, circa 09-06-19 02:30 PM: > > Nick said that I think people would be better off if they believed in an > > inner life. That's not my position. My position is that the existence of > > an inner life seems to me to the only viable foundation for ethics, > > I think it's possible to found ethics on biology (without denying the > existence of "higher level" phenomena), without a unitary "inner self". > I have two (somewhat glib) referencable reasons to think this: 1) > mirror neurons > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neurons > > and 2) various associative patterns in the body (particularly brain/cns): > > Bullies May Enjoy Seeing Others In Pain > http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081107071816.htm > > Without being too reductionist, I think the reasons we avoid > "unacceptable" behavior is simply because we have physiological > structures in our bodies that _tend_ to steer us away from such > behaviors. Over time or distance, by virtue of inter-individual > variation, the acceptability of actions (as observed in others or > potentiated in ourselves) may vary. > > > Now, if you think of ethics or morals as what one _ought_ to do, you > have the additional problem of capturing what is [un]acceptable to the > body. And for that, we have to go back to the concept of "higher level > constructs". To go back to Mary, the color-blind scientist, a > subjective experience of color is _not_ a higher level construct. It's > merely a different way to _slice_ the data she already had (at least > within epsilon of her individual boundary with the environment). The > light that impinges on Mary's boundary is no different. All the same > data is there. Mary just manages to slice it in a different way after > the color-blindness is gone. It's a new _compression_ of the data (a > lossy one at that). It's a new aspect from which to examine the data. > > So, it's not a higher level construct at all. It's a reduction of the > rich data set into a smaller aspect. To be clear, subjective color > perception is a lossy compression of the data available. > > Given that, to extrapolate willy-nilly, all _feelings_ are compressions > of body states. E.g. "feeling nauseous" is the slicing (reduction, > compression) of a milieu of physiological data into a unitary aspect > with a name. That's all any "feeling" is including love, hunger, the > urge to pee, etc. > > OK. Now go back to the foundation of ethics. A foundation for ethical > behavior is to identify, recognize, maintain the accuracy and precision > of, and act upon feelings, the self-somatosensory data available to the > body. > > He who is unethical or immoral is guilty of not paying attention to, and > acting in discordance to, the state of his own body. He who is ethical > and moral pays close attention to, and acts according to, the state of > his own body. He who is amoral ignores the state of his body. [grin] > > Now I'll crawl back under my rock. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
