On 01.02.2011 18:37, Bjoern A. Zeeb wrote:
On Tue, 1 Feb 2011, John Baldwin wrote:
On Monday, January 31, 2011 9:40:09 pm Lawrence Stewart wrote:
On 02/01/11 04:17, John Baldwin wrote:
Somewhat related fallout to the bug reported on security@ recently, I think
this KASSERT() in tcp_output() is bogus:
KASSERT(len + hdrlen + ipoptlen == m_length(m, NULL),
("%s: mbuf chain shorter than expected", __func__));
Specifically, just a few lines earlier in tcp_output() we set the packet
header length to just 'len + hdrlen':
/*
* Put TCP length in extended header, and then
* checksum extended header and data.
*/
m->m_pkthdr.len = hdrlen + len; /* in6_cksum() need this */
Also, the ipoptions are stored in a separate mbuf chain in the in pcb
(inp_options) that is passed as a separate argument to ip_output(). Given
that, I would think that m_length() should not reflect ipoptlen since it
should not include IP options in that chain?
There is some relevant prior discussion on src-committers@ for r212803
between Andre and Bjoern.
I still don't see where ipoptlen bytes are reserved in the mbuf chain. After
this block where 'm' is allocated and initialized:
/*
* Grab a header mbuf, attaching a copy of data to
* be transmitted, and initialize the header from
* the template for sends on this connection.
*/
if (len) {
...
m->m_len = hdrlen;
...
if (len <= MHLEN - hdrlen - max_linkhdr) {
...
m->m_len += len;
} else {
m->m_next = m_copy(mb, moff, (int)len);
...
}
...
} else {
...
m->m_len = hdrlen;
}
The length of the mbuf chain headed by 'm' is clearly hdrlen + len.
It is.
At no point anywhere do we do any sort of m_prepend() or other operation to
allocate space in the mbuf chain for the IP options. They are merged in in
ip_output(). I think the only reason this KASSERT() isn't firing in HEAD is
that IP options are rarely used?
Right and probably reason why I also hit it with IPSec as result of
718 #ifdef IPSEC
719 ipoptlen += ipsec_optlen;
720 #endif
which wasn't because of ipsec_optlen really, I had just stopping
looking too soon back last year.
IPSEC and TCP is very sub-optimal at the moment. The size of the IPSEC header/
overhead is calculated per packet including a full lookup into the SADB. After
the discussions at EuroBSDCon I attempted to solve that in a better way but
didn't finish. Have to dig it up again.
Is there an easy way to test a connection with IP options enabled with this
KASSERT() enabled?
Yes, see patch at [1], and using my modified KASSERT still I get...
which btw sounds wrong to me as well btw as I wouldn't expect ipoptlen
to be 4 here given the test case.
Byte swap issue?
# ./tcpconnect client 127.0.0.1 12345 1 ipopt
panic: tcp_output: mbuf chain shorter than expected: 0 + 60 + 4 - 0 != 60
cpuid = 2
KDB: stack backtrace:
db_trace_self_wrapper() at db_trace_self_wrapper+0x2a
kdb_backtrace() at kdb_backtrace+0x37
panic() at panic+0x187
tcp_output() at tcp_output+0x1d01
tcp_usr_connect() at tcp_usr_connect+0x15f
soconnect() at soconnect+0x14f
kern_connect() at kern_connect+0x12e
connect() at connect+0x41
syscallenter() at syscallenter+0x1cb
syscall() at syscall+0x4c
Xfast_syscall() at Xfast_syscall+0xe2
--- syscall (98, FreeBSD ELF64, connect), rip = 0x80072934c, rsp =
0x7fffffffe9d8, rbp = 0x3 ---
/bz
References:
[1] http://people.freebsd.org/~bz/20110201-01-tcpconnect-ipopt.diff
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