In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Perry E. Metzger" writes: >My strong suggestion for you is that you adopt a similar approach -- >build a good framework that, given good algorithms, will provide >security, and make it easy for users to change over if an algorithm >falls.
If you actually look at GBDE, you will see that any and all of the algorithms can be changed. They are used only in their most basic capability. This was part of the design from the start: not to rely on any single-source algorithm. >Well, so is stock AES 256. I don't see why I should assume your >construction is any better. What do you know that the NIST/NSA review >of AES did not know? That neither the authors of Rinjdael, its reviewers, nor NIST are willing to offer a 25 year warranty on it. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 [EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. _______________________________________________ freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-hackers To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
