> > LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_PRELOAD and LD_DEBUG are ignored for setuid executables > > in FreeBSD. > > But the point being made is that they are not ignored for executables > which have no read access. And from there, read access can be gained, > because at that point, you have code running in the process's address > space. That's right. In other words, there really is no way of protecting executable files from being read if someone is motivated enough. And, in an open-source OS like FreeBSD, it's not a viable solution in any case.... Nate To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Nate Williams
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Nate Williams
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Sean Eric Fagan
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? jkoshy
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Sean Eric Fagan
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Warner Losh
- yet more ways to attack executing binaries (was ... Robert Watson
- Re: yet more ways to attack executing binari... Chris Costello
- Re: yet more ways to attack executing bi... jkoshy
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Dominic Mitchell
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Nate Williams
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Chris Costello
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Nate Williams
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Matthew Dillon