>Yes, but an application can protect itself from an inadvertent core dump. >It can't (today) against being ktrace'd. You'd better fix ptrace and procfs then. Of course, that breaks everything that has always been true, but, hey, it's better to be wrong than right, I guess? if you care about security, you made the damned executable suid or sgid. Then ktrace, ptrace, truss, and core dumps do not work. Even if it simply does setuid(getruid()). To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message
- deny ktrace without read permissions? jkoshy
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Greg Lehey
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Nate Williams
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? jkoshy
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Sheldon Hearn
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions... Warner Losh
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Nate Williams
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Nate Williams
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? Sean Eric Fagan
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions? jkoshy
- Re: deny ktrace without read permissions... Sean Eric Fagan
- Re: deny ktrace without read permis... Warner Losh
- yet more ways to attack executing binari... Robert Watson
- Re: yet more ways to attack executi... Chris Costello
- Re: yet more ways to attack exe... jkoshy
- Re: yet more ways to attack... Dominic Mitchell
- Re: yet more ways to attack... Nate Williams
- Re: yet more ways to attack... Chris Costello
- Re: yet more ways to attack... Nate Williams
- Re: yet more ways to attack... Matthew Dillon