Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak

[Mark Murray]

> http://www.counterpane.com/pseudorandom_number.html
> 
> Cryptlib is described here:
> 
> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/

Thanks!

> > Asynchonous reseeding _improves_ the situation; the attacker cannot force
> > it to any degree of accuracy, and if he has the odds stacked heavily against
> > him that each 256-bits of output will have an associated reseed, it makes
> > his job pretty damn difficult.
> 
> What I meant with that point is that the user may get, say an extra few
> hundred bits out of it with no new entropy before the scheduled reseed
> task kicks in.

How does he know which bits are which? His analysis task just got a whole
lot more difficult.

M
--
Mark Murray
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